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THE PROOF IS IN THE PROCESS:  
SELF-REPORTING UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
 
By Cosette D. Creamer* and Beth A. Simmons** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Recent research has shown that state reporting to human rights monitoring bodies is 
associated with improvements in rights practices, calling into question earlier claims that self-
reporting is inconsequential. Yet little work has been done to explore the theoretical mechanisms 
that plausibly account for this association. This Article systematically documents—across treaties, 
countries, and years—four mechanisms through which reporting can contribute to human rights 
improvements: elite socialization, learning and capacity building, domestic mobilization, and law 
development. These mechanisms have implications for the future of human rights treaty 
monitoring. 
 
Over the past fifty years, the number of international human rights codified in treaty form 
has exploded. There are now nine core multilateral human rights agreements, each with their own 
monitoring body, and several optional protocols.1 This treaty regime covers a range of rights for 
all persons, from civil and political to economic, social, and cultural rights. Dedicated treaties aim 
to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities and women, and to protect the rights of 
children, migrants, and the disabled. Every country has committed itself to at least one of these 
core treaties, and most have ratified several.  
The treaties are administered by reviewing bodies that, among other functions, receive 
reports from the member states on their human rights practices. Recent research has shown that 
reporting states improve their rights practices when they engage in ongoing dialogue with these 
treaty bodies, throwing into question earlier impressions that self-reporting is inconsequential. This 
improvement occurs even though states that report are initially no better at respecting human rights 
than those that do not.2 
 
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
** Andrea Mitchell University Professor, University of Pennsylvania. For helpful feedback, the authors would like 
to thank the anonymous reviewers at the American Journal of International Law, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Antonia 
Chayes, Jean Galbraith, Florencia Montal, Gerald L. Neuman, Gino Pauselli, Kathryn Sikkink, Anton Strezhnev, 
Katharine G. Young, and participants in the Perry World House Workshop at the University of Pennsylvania. The 
authors also thank Emily Graper, Ally Humpert, Audrey Johannes, Diana Li, Gemechu Mekonnen, Narayan 
Narasimhan, Andrea Ortiz, and Maria Sanchez for providing invaluable research assistance, and the University of 
Minnesota Human Rights Initiative for providing generous funding to support this research. All errors are our own. 
1 OHCHR, The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx. 
2 Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention 
Against Torture, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming); Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of 
Periodic Review on Women’s Rights, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (2018). 
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 To be sure, the human rights treaty-body system has faced many challenges. Reform 
discussions have recurred since its inception.3 Commentary has grown more urgent since the early 
2000s, as the system has expanded in size, scope, and membership. In 2009, the UN high 
commissioner for human rights initiated a process to strengthen the treaty bodies, recognizing that 
chronic under-resourcing, backlog, lack of engagement, and complexity of working methods were 
compromising the system. After consultations with states parties, experts, and civil society, the 
high commissioner presented a report to the General Assembly proposing measures to reinforce 
the system.4 Following two years of difficult negotiations among member states, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution to do so.5 This resulted in measures aimed to enhance the treaty 
bodies’ capacity to protect human rights. In 2020 the General Assembly will review these 
measures’ effectiveness and consider additional actions to further improve the system. 
Given these upcoming reform discussions, it is important to understand the nature and 
quality of the self-reporting process and consider evidence-based recommendations for its 
improvement. Over the past decade, our understanding of international treaties’ effects on state 
behavior and human rights outcomes has grown significantly,6 but few studies investigate 
systematically how self-reporting affects treaty implementation and ultimately domestic laws and 
practices. The most rigorous evidence to date establishes a plausible connection between the 
cumulative effects of participating in the reporting process and improved human rights outcomes. 
Recent research shows that the more frequently states participate in the reporting process, the better 
they perform on relevant indicators of rights outcomes.7 In particular, repeated and cumulative 
dialogues with treaty bodies have contributed to lower levels of discrimination against women and 
physical integrity rights violations. Employing a range of statistical techniques, these studies help 
establish a causal connection between the fact of iterated reporting and improved rights practices 
and gesture toward mechanisms of public attention and political mobilization as potential 
explanations for this connection. However, research has yet to explore the range of theoretical 
mechanisms that plausibly account for the link between reporting and rights improvements. In 
short, the process connecting periodic review by the treaty bodies and human rights improvements 
remains opaque. 
This Article demonstrates that certain features of the process of self-reporting to human 
rights treaty bodies can account for the positive relationship between the act of reporting and 
 
3 UN GAOR, 44th Sess. Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including 
Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/44/668 (Nov. 8, 1989). 
4 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body 
System, UN Doc. A/66/860 (2012). 
5 UN GAOR, 68th Sess., Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 9 April 2014, Strengthening and 
Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System, UN Doc. A/RES/68/268 (Apr. 21, 
2014). 
6 KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2017); 
BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); 
Christopher J. Fariss, The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship Between Human 
Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 239 (2018); Kevin L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, 
Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. (2016); Xinyuan Dai, The Conditional Effects 
of International Human Rights Institutions, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 569 (2014). Some researchers argue that international 
treaties have contributed little to improved rights enjoyment, citing weak enforcement. Oona Hathaway, Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN 
RIGHTS A REALITY (2013). 
7 Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & 
Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2. 
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positive human rights outcomes reported in earlier research. In particular, this Article 
systematically documents—across treaties, countries, and years—four mechanisms that theory and 
evidence suggest contribute to human rights improvements: elite socialization, learning and 
capacity building, domestic mobilization, and law development. We show that reports are 
becoming more thorough, increasingly candid, and more relevant to treaty obligations. More states 
are developing the capacity to collect, systematize, and analyze information—and more are willing 
to include such information in their reports—than in the past. Most importantly, the report-and-
review process seeps into domestic politics, as reflected in the growth and localization of civil 
society participation (shadow reporting) and local media publicity. In other words, what is 
discussed in Geneva does not stay in Geneva. It spills over into domestic debates, adding fuel to 
mobilization and prompting demands for implementation. The work of the treaty bodies is also 
increasingly relevant to and informs law development at the regional level.  
This Article’s claims are limited in two respects. First, it should be obvious that rights 
practices are shaped by many complex influences. No monocausal account of law—much less 
reporting under international treaty regimes—can fully determine actual rights protections and 
violations. The processes documented in this Article exist synergistically with a multitude of other 
influences; they do not operate in social, political, or legal isolation. Self-reporting matters because 
bureaucracies can learn, because the media reports, because groups mobilize, and because expert 
decisions and views contribute to law development. A host of other individuals and institutions—
from special rapporteurs to local politicians—play important roles as well. The mechanisms 
discussed here benefit from, amplify, and empower these entities. Second, while the Article 
demonstrates that the reporting process accords with conditions that theoretically facilitate positive 
outcomes, causal tests for each mechanism are not presented here. Rather, we offer empirically 
supported reasons for taking seriously established causal claims between the act of self-reporting 
and positive human rights outcomes.  
This Article first demonstrates in Part I that self-reporting is a crucial and pervasive 
“enforcement” device in both domestic and international law. Part II describes the history and 
evolution of the contemporary human rights self-reporting regime. Part III links self-reporting and 
review to theories of elite socialization, learning and capacity building, political mobilization, and 
law development. The conclusion in Part IV is cautiously optimistic. It entertains critiques, 
including potential problems of reporting fatigue and meaningless bureaucratic ritualization. It also 
offers policy recommendations based on theory and evidence. Far from conceding defeat, reforms 
should continue to focus on making the report-and-review process streamlined, accessible, and 
actionable. 
 
I. SELF-REPORTING AND LAW “ENFORCEMENT” 
 
Self-reporting has become a common tool of regulatory compliance at all levels of 
governance. At the national level, it is often considered the best—and sometimes the only—way 
to elicit information needed to enforce the law. From the U.S. Defense Department’s Contractor 
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Disclosure Program8 to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission9 to the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services,10 American regulators routinely use self-reporting to enhance 
regulatory compliance and encourage the development of self-policing capacity among firms.  
Self-reporting is also central to regional regulatory enforcement. The European Union 
depends on information provided by national administrations and employs “soft” tools such as 
regulatory transparency to encourage compliance with European policies.11 The EU’s Open 
Method of Coordination relies on iterative national reports to assess regulatory progress, provide 
peer review, exchange best practices, and occasionally issue recommendations on how best to 
achieve common regulatory goals.12 A range of actors—national agencies, ministry officials, 
parliamentarians, civil society, and the media—deploy information disclosed during this process 
to set national policy agendas and press for reforms.13 
Critics debate self-reporting systems’ effectiveness in reducing law violations, but some 
domestic evidence suggests it is a useful component in a broader regulatory framework. Self-
reporting systems have contributed to pollution abatement14 by reducing the costs of monitoring,15 
encouraging remediation (or correction) of violations,16 and generally contributing to a norm of 
“self-policing.”17 Firms’ ability and willingness to self-police has long been an important aspect 
of deterrence and compliance in a range of regulatory arenas.18  
These systems also have well-known weaknesses. Often, actors resist self-reporting, 
especially when such requirements are new and perceived as burdensome. One particularly 
disparaged example is Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act,19 which required companies to 
disclose annually whether they had obtained certain minerals from mines controlled by armed 
groups in the Congo. Few reporting requirements have been so severely denounced as costly and 
 
8 Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program, in DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (USAM), TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL (CRM), § 931, at 
http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-931-department-defense-voluntary-disclosure-program.  
9 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) “encourages self-reports of possible violations, and in 
many cases, self-reported violations have resulted in closure of the matter without sanctions.” See FERC, Self Reports, 
at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/self-reports.asp.  
10 The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) relies on “several self-disclosure processes that can be used to report 
potential fraud in Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) Programs.” See OIG, Self-Disclosure Information, 
at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info. 
11 Åse Gornitzka & Ulf Sverdrup, Access of Experts: Information and EU Decision-Making, 34 W. EUR. POL. 48 
(2011). 
12 See CHANGING EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE REGIMES: THE INFLUENCE OF THE OPEN METHOD OF 
COORDINATION ON NATIONAL REFORMS (Martin Heidenreich & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2009).  
13 Rik de Ruiter, Full Disclosure? The Open Method of Coordination, Parliamentary Debates and Media 
Coverage, 14 EUR. UNION POL. 95 (2013); Eva G. Heidbreder, Governance in the European Union: A Policy Analysis 
of the Attempts to Raise Legitimacy Through Civil Society Participation, 17 J. COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS 359 (2015). 
14 See John Livernois & C. J. McKenna, Truth or Consequences: Enforcing Pollution Standards with Self-
Reporting, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 415 (1999); CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL, WINSTON HARRINGTON & WILLIAM J. VAUGHN, 
ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (2011); Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: 
A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675 (1992).  
15 Arun S. Malik, Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 241 (1993). 
16 Robert Innes, Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 379 (1999). 
17 Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate 
Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 609 (2011). 
18 Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994). 
19 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
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ineffective. When some of the initial reports became available for review and analysis, they made 
for quite uninformative reading, with companies typically claiming they could not determine who 
controlled the mines from which they sourced minerals.20  
Yet even this much-maligned reporting requirement spawned potentially interesting 
dynamics. Some companies began to investigate the provenance of their mineral inputs, which 
incentivized implementation of firm governance models that increased the feasibility of tracing 
mineral sourcing. Models of supply chain due diligence were adopted to replace individual firms’ 
uninformative go-it-alone reports.21 Third-party auditors developed a capacity to certify certain 
sources as “conflict free.” While early returns from the reporting were not encouraging, even-
handed analysts noted new reputational pressures to scrutinize supply chains and concluded that 
the system should be improved rather than scrapped.22 More importantly, firms were innovating 
even as they began—often reluctantly—the task of self-reporting. Some optimistic advocates 
attributed a decline in rebel mining in the Congo to greater attention by corporations and 
consumers to sourcing.23  
Domestic self-reporting systems for private or commercial actors, as well as regional 
European ones for governments, differ in an important respect from most international systems: 
they are usually backed by some ability to punish violators if detected. International regimes have 
very limited ability to punish delinquent non-reporters.24 Instead, they must rely on moral suasion 
and peer pressure to encourage report submission. Governments might then face political pressure 
and administrators may even experience “lie aversion,” 25 which creates subtle pressures to be 
honest and thorough.26  
International law depends on self-reporting even more than domestic or regional legal 
systems do. International cooperation is inconceivable—or at least very inefficient—without the 
ability to collect and share credible information.27 Such information makes it theoretically possible 
 
20 Yong H. Kim & Gerald F. Davis, Challenges for Global Supply Chain Sustainability: Evidence from Conflict 
Minerals Reports, 59 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1896 (2016) (finding that the more decentralized and dispersed the vertical 
supply chains, the less likely firms were to certify that their supplies were “conflict free”). 
21 Stephane Timmer & Lutz Kaufmann, Conflict Minerals Traceability – a Fuzzy Set Analysis, 47 INT’L J. 
PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 344 (2017); Hannes Hofmann, Martin C. Schleper & Constantin Blome, 
Conflict Minerals and Supply Chain Due Diligence: An Exploratory Study of Multi-tier Supply Chains, 147 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 115 (2108) (finding that a supply-chain wide management and accountability approach renders traceability 
more feasible than a firm-by-firm approach). 
22 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016). See also Jomo Sankara, 
Deborah L. Lindberg & Khalid A. Razaki, Conflict Minerals Disclosures: Reporting Requirements and Implications 
for Auditing, 10 CURRENT ISSUES IN AUDITING A1 (2016) (noting the increase in auditing triggered by reputational 
pressures). 
23 The Enough Project, Progress and Challenges on Conflict Minerals: Facts on Dodd-Frank 1502, at 
https://enoughproject.org/special-topics/progress-and-challenges-conflict-minerals-facts-dodd-frank-1502.  
24 Differential punishments are useful if actors can expect to escape harsher punishments or more intensive 
scrutiny by reporting than if wrongs are discovered independently. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal 
Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583 (1994).  
25 Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan, Designing Self-Reporting Regimes to Encourage Truth Telling: An 
Experimental Study, 94 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 90 (2013). 
26 This finding is consistent with findings in the context of international human rights regimes. See Cosette D. 
Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the Convention Against 
Torture, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 579 (2015) (finding that the quality of reporting to the Committee Against Torture has 
improved overtime for those states that submit reports). 
27 Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: 
The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POLIT. 1 (1990); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, 
AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).  
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for states to avoid costly conflict28 and realize joint gains that would otherwise be difficult to 
achieve given that “political market failures” are rife internationally.29  
In fact, self-reporting requirements are the most common form of “enforcement” in 
international law and institutions.30 Barbara Koremenos recently found that a little over half of a 
random sample of treaties deposited with the United Nations rely on self-monitoring, third-party 
surveillance, or a combination of both.31 In the area of arms control, some eighty-five of 227 
agreements provide for self-reporting as the most intrusive form of monitoring.32 When the stakes 
are high, self-reporting is often supplemented with verification by an international body, peer 
inspections, and/or unilateral or external monitoring. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
for instance, states parties must initially declare stocks of chemical weapons and subsequent annual 
progress made toward their destruction.33 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons verifies these declarations through onsite inspection. States parties may also request a 
“challenge inspection” of any other state party’s facilities. Self-reporting thus plays a central role 
in arms control, even as verification provisions have increased and external monitoring has become 
denser. 
Other areas of international law rely on self-reporting systems with weaker forms of 
delegated monitoring, while allowing for additional input from civil society, peer governments, 
and international bureaucracies. A good example is trade enforcement, which relies on a system 
of fire alarms rather than police patrols.34 With private firms highly incentivized to report and 
litigate instances of noncompliance,35 information is produced largely through dispute 
settlement.36 However, the World Trade Organization (WTO) also collects information through 
regular “notifications” by governments regarding specific measures, policies, or laws. Regular 
reporting and review of trade policies also occurs through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 
with input provided by the reviewed state and the Organization’s bureaucracy, followed by 
questioning by peer governments within a public forum.37 In this case, the purpose is expressly 
not to enforce WTO law but rather to facilitate trade by providing transparency on members’ 
 
28 James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’L ORG. 379 (1995); Michaela Mattes & Burcu 
Savun, Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 511 (2010); 
DAN LINDLEY, PROMOTING PEACE WITH INFORMATION: TRANSPARENCY AS A TOOL OF SECURITY REGIME (2007); 
POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY (Bernard I. Finel & Kristin M. Lord eds., 2002). 
29 Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141 (Stephen D. 
Krasner ed., 1983). 
30 Ann Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 363, 381 (1996). 
31 BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 261–62 (2016). 
32 Jane Vaynman, Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation Between Adversaries, 
ch. 3 (July 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), available at 
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/13070027.  
33 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction, Art. IX.2, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 UNTS 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993). 
34 Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus 
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
35 Xinyuan Dai, Information Systems in Treaty Regimes, 54 WORLD POL. 405 (2002). 
36 See, e.g., James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional 
Trade Pacts, 54 INT’L ORG. 137 (2000).  
37 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), Art. III & Annex III:A(ii), THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 UNTS 154, 
33 ILM 1144 (1994. 
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policies and practices.38 While an innovation in monitoring multilateral trade agreements, 
practically nothing is known about its consequences. 
 
Self-reporting is also a central pillar in international environmental agreements. Some, like 
the G20 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Agreement, depend almost exclusively on information from adhering 
states.39 In many instances, self-reporting complements other forms of information gathering 
thought to be critical to transparency and ultimately compliance. For example, various “systems 
for implementation review” exist in international environmental agreements, “through which the 
parties share information, compare activities, review performance, handle noncompliance, and 
adjust commitments.”40 While existing research does not theorize how state-generated self-reports 
can affect behavior,41 the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is likely a critical 
element. Many observers note the similarity between the watchdog role that NGOs play in 
supplementing state reporting in environmental and human rights implementation processes.42  
Monitoring provisions are also common in human rights agreements. In Koremenos’s 
random sample, about 41 percent of human rights agreements contained no monitoring provisions 
at all, which is almost the exact proportion for international agreements as a whole (40 percent).43 
The remaining 59 percent of human rights agreements sampled are fairly “densely monitored” and 
commonly require states parties to report to “internal bodies” (e.g., treaty-based implementation 
committees) and establish a formal monitoring role for existing intergovernmental organizations 
(e.g., UN bodies) as well. For instance, since 2006, Universal Periodic Review has enhanced self-
reporting to peers in the UN Human Rights Council. Overall, the international community depends 
heavily on states parties to provide the raw material for human rights oversight.44 
In issue areas from arms control to the environment, and from trade to human rights, state-
generated information provision and review have been critical in increasing the transparency 
necessary for treaty implementation.45 But has self-reporting enhanced international human rights 
treaty implementation? If so, how? It was certainly intended to do so, as the historical record 
discussed in the next part demonstrates. 
 
II. SELF-REPORTING UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
  
 
38 Roderick Abbott, GATT and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Further Reflections on Earlier Reflections, 
27 J. WORLD TRADE 117 (1993); Richard Blackhurst, Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies, in 
THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 123 (Meinhard 
Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988); Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy 
in the International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 
16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013). 
39 Joseph E. Aldy, Policy Surveillance in the G-20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement: Lessons for Climate Policy 
(Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 15-70, 2015), available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dp70_aldy.pdf. 
40 David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Introduction and Overview, in THE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 3 (David G. 
Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998). 
41 Id. at 11. 
42 IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29–47 (Jacob Werksman, James 
Cameron & Peter Roderick eds., 1996). 
43 KOREMENOS, supra note 31, at 261–62. 
44 Dai, supra note 35, at 405.  
45 Victor, Raustiala & Skolnikoff, supra note 40, at 24. 
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Historical Development  
 
Self-reporting is the tip of the spear of the accountability revolution in international human 
rights. Before World War I, there are only hints of such accountability in areas we might recognize 
as related to human rights. Reporting by states parties was discussed in the area of labor standards 
and in limited regional agreements to address what today we call human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. As early as 1905, a draft labor convention called on national supervisory authorities 
to “publish regularly reports on the execution of the present convention and to exchange these 
reports among themselves.”46  
Two world wars changed global attitudes about state accountability, which was slowly 
built into inter-war international law and organizations. In November 1918, the League of Nations 
Committee on Labor urged governments to provide for the creation of an International Labor 
Office in the Paris Treaty of Peace. This office would be charged with the “collection and 
comparison of the measures taken to carry out international [labor] conventions and of the 
government reports on their observance.”47 The next year, an American draft included reference 
to states parties reporting to the secretary-general of the League of Nations any actions taken in 
response to a “recommendation of the General Conference [of Labor] communicated to it.”48 The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) constitution signed in 1919 ultimately required annual 
reports that “shall be made in such form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing Body 
may request.”49 
The Mandate System under the League of Nations also relied on reports from countries 
charged with overseeing non-self-governing territories, a practice continued under the Trusteeship 
Council of the United Nations.50 Early human-trafficking conventions further signaled the 
emergence of reporting norms. Agreements negotiated in 1904 and 1910 to curb trafficking in 
prostitution had rudimentary information-exchange provisions,51 and eventually came under the 
supervision of the League’s Advisory Committee on the Traffic of Women and Children.52 States 
began reporting to Geneva on anti-trafficking measures in the early 1920s,53 and the 1926 Slavery 
Convention created an additional obligation to report relevant anti-trafficking laws to other parties 
 
46 Sir Malcolm Delevingne, The Pre-War History of International Labor Legislation, in THE ORIGINS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, VOLUME ONE: HISTORY 3, 29–39 (James T. Shotwell ed., 1934). 
47 Charles Picquenard, The Preliminaries of the Peace Conference, in THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR ORGANIZATION, VOLUME ONE: HISTORY, supra note 46, at 88. 
48 Edward J. Phelan, The Commission of International Labor Legislation, in THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR ORGANIZATION, VOLUME ONE: HISTORY, supra note 46, at 159. 
49 Treaty of Peace at Versailles, Art. 408, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry 188, 2 Bevans 235, 13 AJIL Supp. 151, 385 
(1919). 
50 Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 22, June 28, 1919; Charter of the United Nations (1945), Arts. 73(e), 
83, 87(a), 88. 
51 International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 
LNTS 83 (entered into force 18 July 1905); International Convention for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” 
May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. TS 45, 1912 GR. Brit. TS No. 20, as amended by Protocol Amending the International 
Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, and Amending the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 4, 1949, 2 UST 1999, 30 UNTS 23 (entered into force June 21, 1951). 
103 BFSP 244 (1910). 
52 See HENRY WILSON HARRIS, HUMAN MERCHANDISE: A STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN WOMEN 27 
(1928). 
53 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, concluded at Geneva on 
Sept. 30 1921, as amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on Nov. 12, 1947, 9 LNTS 415 (entered 
into force June 15, 1922); HARRIS, supra note 52, at 27. 
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and the League secretary-general,54 though it failed to provide procedures for review or follow-
up. In 1930, the British government tried to use the Permanent Mandates Commission model to 
gather information through reports to a “Permanent Slavery Organization,” but these efforts failed 
due to the financial constraints of the inter-war depression and the outbreak of World War II.55 A 
more elaborated system for reporting and information sharing to counter human trafficking and 
other rights violations would have to await the postwar period.56  
The postwar international order crucially changed the context for human rights. 
Democratic governance was reestablished in many countries, including in the heart of Europe. 
Transnational organizations and faith-based organizations found their voices in advocating for 
human rights. Crumbling empires would be replaced by a wave of newly independent nation states. 
Many of these emerging states found common cause with rights advocates in their calls for national 
self-determination.57  
The postwar period was a watershed for both international human rights and for what has 
been called the “regulatory turn” in international law.58 This regulatory turn undoubtedly fueled 
reporting as an enforcement mechanism, especially in international human rights law. Most 
basically, state reporting was a way for the United Nations to collect information for law 
development in the first place.59 This role had been carried out on a limited basis under the League 
of Nations, but it became more common and widespread as human rights principles were codified 
in the early 1960s.60 UN protocols increasingly called on states to submit information in the context 
of conciliation and dispute-settlement procedures.61 Of central concern here, state reporting was 
employed first in general hortatory requests and then as a treaty obligation in an effort to secure 
adherence.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the focus of these efforts. The 
UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) both passed resolutions 
requesting information on state law and practice on human rights. As early as 1947, the General 
Assembly recommended that the UN secretary-general request member states to report annually 
to ECOSOC, which would in turn report to the General Assembly on steps taken to give effect to 
“recommendations made by the General Assembly on matters falling within the Council’s 
 
54 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Art. VII, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 2191, 60 LNTS 
253, 263, amended by Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926, New York on 
Dec. 7, 1953, 7 UST 479, 182 UNTS 51.  
55 Kathryn Zoglin, United Nations Action Against Slavery: A Critical Evaluation, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 306 (1986). 
56 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 
at New York on Mar. 21, 1950, 96 UNTS 271. 
57 SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 23–42. 
58 Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 321 (2011). 
59 State reporting was built into a broad range of UN activities and areas of responsibility. For example, 
UNESCO’s constitution provided that members report on “laws, regulations and statistics relating to educational, 
scientific and cultural life and institutions.” Constitution of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 
Art. VII, Nov. 16, 1945, 4 UNTS 275. 
60 For example, Economic and Social Council Res. 934 (XXXV) urged governments to inform the secretary-
general of any new developments in law and practice regarding capital punishment and requested the secretary-general 
to prepare a report based on information received. UN GAOR 3d Comm., 18th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1252 (Nov. 
4, 1963). 
61 See, e.g., UNESCO General Conference, 12th Sess., Protocol Instituting a Conciliation and Good Offices 
Commission to be Responsible for Seeking the Settlement of Any Disputes which May Arise Between States Parties 
to the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Art. 16 (Dec. 10, 1962). 
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competence.”62 This resolution was intended to include UDHR principles, which had no explicit 
provisions for implementation. Few states responded to such a general exhortation. ECOSOC thus 
postponed systematic review and instead perused the few reports it received on an ad hoc basis. 
Five years later, the submission of official state reports remained a rarity, so the Council 
discontinued this system of self-reporting entirely.63 
In 1956, ECOSOC again passed a resolution calling for systematic self-reporting on human 
rights.64 It requested UN members to transmit reports every three years describing how they were 
implementing UDHR principles. John Humphrey, then serving as rapporteur of the International 
Committee on Human Rights, later reported that forty-one states (exactly half) responded as 
requested in the first round of reporting, and sixty-seven (over 80 percent) responded in the second 
round (1957–59). But Cold War rhetoric and a perfunctory review by the Human Rights 
Commission rendered the exercise ineffective.65 Self-reporting received a boost six years later, 
when NGOs with consultative status in ECOSOC were invited to submit their views and 
observations to the Council.66 The system of “shadow reporting” by civil society organizations 
was thereby conceived. 
At best, the general call for reports on progress toward realizing the UDHR was a soft law 
obligation. The problem remained state cooperation. In 1965, ECOSOC invited states to participate 
in a three-year cycle of reporting on civil and political rights, economic and social rights, and 
freedom of information.67 This process routed state reports through the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which generally failed to read 
them—an outcome John Humphrey called “a political victory won by governments who do not 
favour the international enforcement of human rights.”68 Rights advocates knew, however, they 
were not in a position to do much more than request state information. Despite his frustrations, 
Humphrey concluded that “[o]f the various techniques, reporting is the one with which the 
international community has had the most and probably the most successful experience” and that 
given government reticence to accept international oversight, “reporting may indeed, even for 
these rights, be the most practical means of implementation.”69  
 
The Consent-Based Treaty System 
 
Self-reporting as part of a consent-based treaty obligation was another route to enhance 
implementation. This approach built on an explicit legal commitment and engaged expert 
implementation committees rather than government-composed bodies of the United Nations. As 
early as 1947, the Drafting Committee for the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) proposed a state reporting mechanism, to be triggered by UN General Assembly 
resolution, for “an explanation, certified by the highest legal authorities of the State concerned, as 
 
62 Implementation of Recommendations on Economic and Social Matters (1947) UNGA 15; A/RES/119 (II) (Oct. 
31, 1947). 
63 John Humphrey, Report of the Rapporteur of the International Committee on Human Rights, in REPORT OF THE 
FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE [OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION] HELD AT BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, 
AUGUST 25TH TO AUGUST 31ST, 1968, at 439 (1969).  
64 ECOSOC Res. 624 B(XXII), para. 12, UN ESCOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. E/2929 (Aug. 17, 1956). 
65 Humphrey, supra note 63. 
66 ECOSOC Res. 888B (XXXIV), para. 21, UN ESCOR, 18th Sess., UN Doc. E/3676 (July 24, 1962). 
67 ECOSOC Res. 1074C (XXXIX), paras. 24–25, UN ESCOR, 21st Sess., UN Doc. E/4100 (July 28, 1965).  
68 Humphrey, supra note 63. 
69 Id. at 438–39. 
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to the manner in which the law of that state gives effect to any of the said provisions of this Bill of 
Rights.”70 The United States proposed amending this to regularized two-year intervals.71 When 
the commission on human rights resumed discussion of the draft in 1950, the Soviet Union and its 
allies resisted the inclusion of any reporting procedures as contrary to Article 2.7 of the UN 
Charter, which prohibits the UN from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.72 Resistance was due in part to the concern that while similar procedures 
were developing with respect to the drafting of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), that treaty was to be “progressively realized” while the ICCPR was 
“intended, in the main, to be applied immediately.”73 Moreover, the idea of reporting on progress 
toward implementation might, some feared, undercut the idea that states should be in compliance 
with the ICCPR upon ratification.74  
To whom reports would be submitted was initially controversial as well. On the one hand, 
the idea of reporting to the General Assembly was anathema insofar as it meant that obligated 
states would in effect be reporting to those who remained outside the treaty arrangement.75 On the 
other hand, some states objected to an autonomous body of individuals acting in their personal 
capacity as experts.76 The former view prevailed, although the final draft acknowledged that the 
reports could also be forwarded to UN specialized agencies after consultation with the treaty 
body.77  
The Cold War effectively put the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR on ice between the 
tenth and twenty-first sessions of the Human Rights Commission (between 1954 and 1966). The 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), negotiated in the early 1960s 
and entering into force in 1965, turned out to be the path-breaking treaty that provided the model 
for nearly all major subsequent human rights agreements and established the precedent that human 
rights treaties must contain some means for implementation.78 While CERD drafters could look to 
the (unadopted) drafts of the “international bill of rights,” the convention broke new ground as the 
first major post-UDHR treaty in force to require states to report to a treaty body. As such, the 
CERD provided an important model, especially for anti-discrimination treaties such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) negotiated a decade 
later. 
Several historical streams converged in the late 1950s and early 1960s to elevate racial 
equality above “the sacred notions of sovereignty so closely guarded by many UN member 
states.”79 The civil rights movement highlighted embarrassing conditions in the United States and 
 
70 MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 615 (1987). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 617.  
73 While there was a desire to make the ICESCR and ICCPR as similar as possible, the prevailing view was that 
they ought not be identical. Even liberal democracies voiced hesitancy about equating the two agreements for reporting 
purposes. Id. at 619.  
74 For example, this point was made by Pakistan. Id. 
75 See the comments of the United Kingdom and Belgium. Id. at 620.  
76 See the comments of Tunisia. Id. at 621. 
77 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 40(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 40(3) 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  
78 STEVEN L. B. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 1960S, DECOLONIZATION, AND 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL VALUES 102 (2016); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Art. 9(1), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 UNTS 195, 216 [hereinafter CERD]. 
79 JENSEN, supra note 78, at 103. 
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created a sense of urgency surrounding the CERD.80 Following the Holocaust, Israel pushed 
vocally for racial and religious tolerance. South African apartheid was also a focal point for the 
evils of extreme racial discrimination. But the decolonization movement itself provided the 
necessary condition for accelerating and strengthening international commitments to 
nondiscrimination based on race. It rapidly transformed the UN’s composition, and the leadership 
of an Afro-Asian coalition spearheaded by Ghana, the Philippines, and others united the newly 
independent states.81 In the Cold War context, decolonization also provoked the major powers to 
engage. 
This global political context made possible consideration of binding legal obligations 
forbidding discrimination based on race. The CERD draft developed alongside the ICCPR and 
ICESCR, and as the first of the three to enter into force provided the model for implementation 
that would be replicated with only minor variations in subsequent agreements: a triad of 
petitioning, state-to-state complaints, and self-reporting to a treaty body. The first of these was 
optional and voluntary, as in every treaty to come. The second, while obligatory under CERD, is 
optional for all subsequent treaties and altogether absent from CEDAW. Moreover, it has scarcely 
been used. The third provided the minimum floor for treaty implementation. As the most broadly 
used component of the triad—and because of the institutional path dependence initiated by 
CERD—it is worth excavating the logics and interests expressed at its creation.  
Debates over the CERD text reveal a keen sense of the limits of law alone to ensure 
compliance with international human rights obligations. Treaty drafters did not see public 
production of information as an alternative for international rule of law but as a complement. 
Delegates realized that racial attitudes were stubborn and would require treaty law, education, 
information, and supportive media and courts.82 Self-reporting was considered a potentially 
powerful way to develop state capacity to prevent and punish racial discrimination. Some of the 
most powerful delegations were interested in pushing toward “fact-finding and reporting 
machinery . . . of the United Nations” so that members could be “helped to build up national 
institutions and national laws to give practical meaning to the principles endorsed by the draft 
Declaration.”83  
But what should CERD reporting obligations look like? Three models were debated.84 In 
one, states would report in the context of quasi-judicial or conciliatory processes. In a second, 
reports would originate from civil society alleging treaty violations.85 In a third, states would report 
 
80 Id. at 111 (noting that thirteen states commented on race relations in the United States during the 1963 debate). 
81 Id. at 22. 
82 ECOSOC, Report on the Commission of Human Rights: Manifestations of Racial Prejudice and National and 
Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. E/RES/826 (XXXII) (July 27, 1961); UN GAOR 3d Comm., paras. 5–6, 24, 17th 
Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1167 (Oct. 30, 1962); UN GAOR 3d Comm., 17th Sess., para. 2, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1171 
(Nov. 2, 1962).  
83 UN GAOR 3d Comm., para. 8, 18th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1217 (Oct. 1, 1963). 
84 A Philippine proposal called for all three: submission of state reports, establishment of UN Good Offices, and 
a mechanism for petition by individuals or groups alleging violation (Art. 16). See “Draft International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Philippines: Articles Relating to Measures of 
Implementation to be Added to the Provisions of the Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights (A/5921, annex),” UN GAOR 3d Comm., 
20th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1221 (Oct. 11, 1965). 
85 Id.; UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination: Ghana: Revised Amendments to the Articles Relating to Measures of Implementation Submitted by 
the Philippines (A/C.3/L.1221), UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1274/Rev.l (Nov.12, 1965). 
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regularly on their own implementation,86 with Costa Rica drafting an amendment additionally 
inviting what are referred to today as civil society shadow reports.87 Each mechanism had 
recognized weaknesses. State-based procedures were subject to politics, and their “effectiveness 
suffered accordingly.”88 Critics argued that ad hoc individual complaints would not assure 
legislative implementation.89 States reluctant to empower private actors in an international treaty 
criticized civil society initiation as unproductive.90 Periodic state reports were considered “useful 
but . . . not enough, since they did not allow for intervention at the time when a violation took 
place.”91  
Self-reporting was an important supplement to other measures and commonly mentioned 
as “the bare minimum”92 for implementing a serious human rights agreement. At least one state 
(Jamaica) emphasized the value of examination, review, and evaluation attendant to the obligation 
to report.93 Ultimately, all three approaches were adopted in CERD: conciliation procedures were 
established,94 periodic reporting was required by states,95 and complaints by private individuals 
were permitted.96 Despite concerns about redundancy associated with reporting for each individual 
treaty,97 the three major multilateral human rights treaties of the 1960s—CERD, ICCPR, and 
ICESCR—each developed their own fairly similar implementation committees and reporting 
regimes.98  
After a lull in human rights codification, the international community turned to women’s 
rights. Early treaties dealing with women’s rights had practically no implementation provisions.99 
But by early 1967, the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) began drafting a 
nonbinding Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, which was adopted 
 
86 UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Official Records, 1344th Mtg., Nov. 16 1965, New York, UN Doc. 
A/C.3/SR.1344 (Nov. 16, 1965).   
87 UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Costa Rica: Amendment to the Draft Resolution (826B(XXXII)) Submitted 
by the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1008 (Oct. 29, 1965).  
88 UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86, para. 63. 
89 Id., paras. 46, 48. 
90 UN GAOR 3d Comm., para. 39, 17th Sess., Official Records, 1170th mtg., Nov. 1, 1962, New York, UN Doc. 
A/C.3/SR.1170 (Nov. 1, 1962). 
91 UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86, para. 58. 
92 Comments to this effect include those of Mexico and Jordan. Several countries, including Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and France, saw state reporting as meaningless without an individual right to petition. See UN GAOR 
3d Comm., 20th Sess., Official Records, 1345th mtg., Nov. 17, 1965, New York, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1345 (Nov. 17, 
1965).  
93 UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., para. 45, Official Records, 1346th mtg., Nov. 17, 1965, New York, UN Doc. 
A/C.3/SR.1346 (Nov. 17, 1965). 
94 CERD, supra note 78, Art.12. 
95 Id. Art. 9. 
96 Id. Art. 14. 
97 UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86, para. 62. 
98 The ICESCR initially required reports to be submitted to ECOSOC, but later moved to review by a separate 
treaty body in 1985. ECOSOC E/RES/1985/17 (May 28, 1985). 
99 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Nov. 2, 1962, 521 UNTS 231; Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 UNTS 135; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Jan. 29, 1957, 
309 UNTS 65. Until CEDAW, no treaty on women’s rights or issues contained an obligation for parties to self-report. 
However, several ILO labor conventions aim to protect female workers from discrimination and have a reporting 
requirement. These include: Equal Remuneration Convention (ILO No.100), June 29, 1951, 165 UNTS 303; 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (ILO No.111), June 25, 1958, 362 UNTS 31; Workers 
with Family Responsibilities Convention (ILO No. 156), June 23, 1981, 1331 UNTS 295; Maternity Protection 
Convention (ILO No. 183), June 15, 2000, 2181 UNTS 253. 
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by the General Assembly in November of that year.100 ECOSOC and CSW worked on strategies 
for implementing the declaration over the next several years. In the hortatory tradition described 
earlier, one tactic was to ask states to submit voluntary reports on their implementation efforts, but 
this request elicited little cooperation.101 By the mid-1970s, the CSW began working on a 
comprehensive and legally binding instrument, soliciting comments of governments and 
specialized agencies. 
Self-reporting requirements were a central part of the discussions of the Working Group 
that drafted CEDAW. Although an early Soviet draft did not contain a reporting requirement, 
directing only that ECOSOC consider implementation periodically,102 initial discussions revealed 
a willingness to include one, with most states considering the ILO, CERD, or ICCPR to be 
appropriate models.103 The Netherlands called for civil society participation, “granting these 
organizations . . . a role in channelling [sic] wishes and complaints towards an international 
forum,” such as the CSW.104 Canada suggested that all reporting go through the CSW to avoid 
“conflict in implementation procedures” across treaties.105 Several countries anticipated the 
modern critique of reporting overlap, and called for simplification.106 Women’s groups were 
strongly behind reporting; in fact the draft article on state reporting was the only provision 
mentioned explicitly in a crucial 1976 statement by a broad coalition of women’s NGOs sent to 
the Working Group.107 In the end, Egypt, Nigeria, and Zaire’s proposal to use language almost 
identical to that contained in the CERD was accepted.108 A series of working groups finalized the 
agreement in 1979, and the CEDAW—with Article 18 describing the obligation to report on 
implementation—opened for signature the next year. 
 
Current Practice and Recent Reforms 
 
Today, each of the nine core international human rights conventions establishes an 
independent treaty body to monitor implementation.109 These committees are comprised of ten to 
 
100 UN GAOR General Assembly Resolution: Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
A/RES/2263(XXII) (Nov. 7, 1967). 
101 LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 7 (1993). 
102 ECOSOC, Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments of International law to Eliminate 
Discrimination Against Women, Working Paper Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, draft Art. 22, 
UN Doc. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.2. (Jan. 7, 1974). 
103 ECOSOC, Commission on the Status of Women, 24th Sess., International Instruments and National Standards 
Relating to the Status of Women: Study of Provisions in Existing Conventions that Relate to the Status of Women, 
para. 236, UN Doc. E/CN.6/552 (Jan. 21, 1972); ECOSOC, Commission on the Status of Women, 25th Sess., 
International Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of Women: Consideration of Proposals 
Concerning a New Instrument of Instruments of International Law to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, paras. 
103, 106, UN Doc. E/CN.6/573 (Nov. 6, 1973). 
104 UN Doc. E/CN.6/573, supra note 103, para.105. 
105 Id., para.104. 
106 These included Austria, Brazil, and Canada. Id., paras. 108–10. 
107 Commission on the Status of Women, 26th Sess., Statement Submitted by the International Alliance of Women 
et al., para. 4, UN Doc. E/CN.6/NGO/259 (Aug. 26, 1976). 
108 ECOSOC, Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments of International law to Eliminate 
Discrimination Against Women, Nigeria and Zaire: Draft Proposals Concerning the Measures of Implementation of 
the Draft Convention, UN Doc. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.5 (Jan. 9, 1974).  
109 The nine core international human rights treaties identified by the OHCHR consist of: CERD, supra note 78; 
ICCPR, supra note 77; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3 
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twenty-three independent experts nominated and elected by states parties for fixed, renewable 
terms of four years. By virtue of treaty ratification, states must submit periodic reports to each 
committee—ranging from every two to every five years—on the legislative, judicial, 
administrative, or other measures adopted to give effect to human rights obligations.110 Periodic 
reporting has thus become an aspect of procedural compliance with a government’s treaty 
obligations.111 Niger submitted the first ever state report to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination in January 1970. By 2017, the committees for the nine core treaties had 
received on average 129 state reports each year.112  
The treaty bodies largely employ the same general framework in examining reports. While 
not required, committees invite government delegations to Geneva to participate in an in-person 
consideration of the report.113 A team of government officials appears before the treaty body for 
two or three three-hour discussions. Each review begins with the state’s introductory statement 
followed by committee acknowledgement of the state’s implementation progress. Rapporteurs are 
assigned to each country to provide a comprehensive overview of missing information, identify 
discrepancies between domestic and treaty law, point to previous recommendations on which they 
saw no progress, and request follow-up information on these recommendations.114 Questions by 
other committee members follow. Sometimes state representatives answer on the spot; other times 
the government commits to follow up in writing. Committee members use this interaction to 
expound on what is normatively appropriate under the treaty. This so-called “constructive 
dialogue” provides an opportunity for mutual engagement, acknowledgment of progress made, 
and identification of areas for improvement.115  
Initially, the treaty bodies did not provide any collective assessment following their review. 
In 1980, the Human Rights Committee (ICCPR’s treaty body) extensively debated whether or how 
it should express comments on state reports. Most committee members favored committee reports, 
“conducted in such a way as not to turn the reporting procedure into contentious or inquisitory 
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See CED, supra note 109, Art. 29. 
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proceedings, but rather to provide valuable assistance to the State party concerned in the better 
implementation of the provisions of the Covenant.”116 However, a minority supported the German 
Democratic Republic’s view that the committee’s primary function was not to “interfere . . . in the 
internal affairs of States parties,” but instead to merely include within its annual reports general 
comments addressed to all states parties.117 A Soviet-coordinated bloc of members thus prevented 
treaty bodies from being able to pass judgment on the human rights situations in states throughout 
the 1980s.118 This changed in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. Now all committees publish 
some form of “concluding observations” containing recommendations for specific reforms a 
government should undertake to address implementation shortcomings.119 Most commentators 
agree that these recommendations are not legally binding,120 but all state reports and committee 
observations are made public121 and sometimes cited by domestic and regional courts,122 arguably 
raising the political stakes of ignoring them.  
These basic elements have remained essentially unchanged, although a few reforms have 
been introduced to help strengthen the treaty-body system. The creation of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 1993 was transformatory.123 Before its creation, 
there was almost no capacity for human rights training124 or strategic thinking on reform.125 Far 
from just another example of an inflated UN bureaucracy, its establishment was a game changer 
that greatly improved the international community’s capacity to make state reporting meaningful. 
 First, the OHCHR harmonized reporting guidelines across treaties, at the request of the 
General Assembly.126 These include guidelines on a “common core document,” which provides 
background information, the general framework for the protection and promotion of human rights, 
and information on effective remedies. States need submit only one common core document to all 
treaty bodies, updating as necessary. This reduces reporting redundancy and encourages states to 
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report periodically on treaty-specific information. The guidelines also limit the length of periodic 
reports. 
Second, to improve the quality of the constructive dialogue, some committees began giving 
states a set of questions in advance of their report’s review. They further expanded on this practice 
by making available a simplified procedure employing a “List of Issues Prior to Reporting” 
(LOIPR).127 The state party’s replies to the LOIPR count as its report for that treaty. In 2014, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution that encouraged use of this simplified procedure across all 
treaty bodies.128 It has since become standard practice to focus on these priorities, and the chairs 
of the treaty bodies—with the assistance of the OHCHR Secretariat—have made efforts to further 
harmonize their simplified procedure working methods in light of the 2020 treaty body review.129 
This includes recently agreeing to coordinate each treaty’s list of issues for a given country, to 
reduce unnecessary overlap.  
Third, the OHCHR invested in developing state capacities.130 In 2015, the OHCHR 
enhanced regional training and workshops on state reporting, and developed a Practical Guide for 
reporting and follow-up in 2016.131 The OHCHR also encouraged the establishment of dedicated 
national mechanisms to coordinate reporting and follow-up across national institutions and civil 
society.132  
Finally, the OHCHR took a leading role in providing support to a range of stakeholders, so 
that they might better engage with the periodic review process. It works closely with national 
human rights institutions (NHRIs) to support their interaction with the treaty bodies and civil 
society organizations.133 A number of NHRIs now hold national consultations on report 
preparation or otherwise provide input to the state report; several submit alternative reports and/or 
provide oral briefings to the treaty bodies, either prior to or during the constructive dialogue.134 
The OHCHR also encourages civil society participation by providing treaty-specific guidelines for 
submitting shadow reports and attending sessions.135  
 
 
127 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, 99th Sess., Focused 
Reports Based on Replies to Lists of Issues Prior to Reporting (LOIPR): Implementation of the New Optional 
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Assessments of Self-Reporting  
 
How effective has this system of self-reporting been over the past half century? Although 
positive assessments are hard to find, a few authors note that self-reporting can, under some 
circumstances, have positive effects. Sally Engle Merry finds in her study of gender violence that 
NGOs have used the CEDAW Committee’s concluding remarks to pressure governments to 
protect women from violence.136 Xinyuan Dai reports positively on the informational role that 
independent NGOs play in the monitoring process.137 A study by C.H. Heyns and Frans Viljoen 
mentions several committee observations and recommendations that have been flagrantly ignored, 
but lists others that have been heeded, such as the release of prisoners in Egypt, the disbanding of 
armed civilian groups in Colombia, and attention to minority cultural rights in Estonia.138 Positive 
accounts typically stress that the influence of this process is diffuse and indirect, with the media, 
NGOs, domestic actors, and other governments using the committees’ concluding observations to 
pressure governments for change.139  
Much more common are criticisms of the system as inadequate, ineffective, and even “in 
crisis.”140 Many governments fail to report altogether.141 Reports vary considerably across 
countries and over time in their structure and quality.142 Some commentators suggest that reporting 
varies by treaty as well: it may be easier to engage with obligations under CEDAW and CRC rather 
than on torture and civil rights.143 States often provide inconsistent and meaningless data in their 
reports, making it hard to assess implementation.144 Quality reporting requires expertise in and 
familiarity with the treaty and the reporting process, which many states apparently lack. And of 
course, capacity is not the only issue. Some states simply refuse to render self-critical reports,145 
and even resource-rich democratic states do not always do what experts tell them they should do.146  
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Government commitment and state capacity both tend to contribute to compliance with 
reporting requirements. Gross domestic product per capita is strongly associated with the 
likelihood of reporting, suggesting that wealthier states are better able to bear the costs of 
compiling legislation, collecting data, and studying outcomes. For some treaties (such as CAT and 
CRC) bureaucratic capacity (in the form of an NHRI) also correlates with report submission as 
well as reporting quality.147 NHRIs supply for many states the institutional capacity needed to 
provide factual knowledge of, expertise in, and familiarity with the treaty regime and reporting 
process.148 Two other factors also correlate with better reporting: commitment to human rights law 
(widespread human rights treaty ratification) and regional reporting norms and socialization (the 
higher the regional reporting density, the more likely a state from that same region will report). 
States with the resources and a broad legal commitment to international human rights treaties are 
much more likely to turn in their reports than are poor states and spotty ratifiers. It is, however, 
not the case that nondemocratic countries or those with poor human rights records systematically 
avoid reporting.149 
Much of the criticism leveled at the self-reporting process focuses on the oversight 
machinery itself.150 Bias and politicization of the process is a common concern. By 2000, almost 
half of the elected treaty-body members had been government employees.151 It is easy to find 
disparaging accounts of some committee members’ commitment to the task at hand,152 and other 
members’ ritualistic commentary and superficial questioning.153 Cultural insensitivity further 
reduces genuine dialogue and leads to formalistic recommendations that many states are unlikely 
to take up.154 In addition, some governments complain the treaty bodies have overreached, 
assuming “additional responsibilities not envisaged in the . . . treaties.”155  
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The oversight machinery is severely under-resourced, leading to a host of inadequacies. 
Committee members are not paid and often employed by governments or other institutions with 
the potential to compromise independence. They are swamped with work and sometimes take more 
than a year to respond to state reports.156 Despite this, over the past two years the General 
Assembly adopted budget cuts that significantly impacted the treaty body system, which now faces 
a serious financial crisis and at one point the possibility of cancelled meetings in order to cut 
costs.157 The capacity to follow up in practice on their recommendations is also severely limited.158 
While the OHCHR Secretariat and treaty body chairs have recently made efforts to harmonize and 
strengthen the follow-up procedure for urgent recommendations, the CRC Committee has 
discontinued follow-up due to resource constraints.159 Repeatedly, the individual committees miss 
opportunities to work across institutions, such as when economic, social, and cultural rights are 
violated during periods of transitional justice.160 
Once concluding observations are rendered, there is little consensus on their impact. 
Several studies discuss their influence, but it is hard to tell whether the glass is half empty or half 
full, what criteria authors use to determine effectiveness, and whether the committees’ 
observations play any causal role.161 Most literature on the treaty bodies is descriptive, and while 
many observers move readily from description to critique and policy recommendations,162 it is 
difficult to infer what contribution the process has made to rights on the ground. Critics assert that 
those most affected by treaty violations are not even aware of the periodic review process. Hafner-
Burton summarizes an informal (and untested) consensus among commentators that “the reports 
often don’t seem to lead to results that matter.”163 
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Despite these critical assessments, recent cross-national studies have found a correlation 
between reporting and better rights outcomes.164 How might this be explained? The next Part 
theorizes the mechanisms through which self-reporting might lead to improvements. 
 
III. MECHANISMS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENT 
 
“Self-reporting” is a much more complex system than the name implies. It is not 
synonymous with whitewashed documents that receive brief acknowledgement in Geneva and then 
never see the light of day. Every step of this process creates opportunities for impact (and 
potentially backlash). Reviewing laws and collecting new data involve activating a domestic 
bureaucracy. Actors who otherwise might not have the chance to form coalitions, alter the policy 
agenda, or provide different versions of the status of treaty implementation are at least minimally 
empowered. The reporting process also offers external experts an opportunity to teach about 
international obligations, produce actionable recommendations, and learn about constraints 
experienced and resistance encountered. While not a panacea for protecting human rights, self-
reporting is an opportunity to persuade, learn, build capacity, mobilize politically, and contribute 
to transnational law development. It is a crucial part of a broader system of human rights 
accountability. 
Global correlations linking participation in the report-and-review process with rights 
improvements exist, notably for CEDAW and CAT.165 But a theoretical account of the 
mechanisms underpinning these correlations is needed. Where feasible, we present global evidence 
to demonstrate the plausibility of these mechanisms for four treaty regimes: ICCPR, CEDAW, 
CAT, and CRC.  
We limit our focus to these four treaties for a number of reasons. These represent some of 
the most important core multilateral human rights treaties, covering a broad range of universal as 
well as group-specific rights. Yet they also vary in ways that permit examination of the self-
reporting process in distinct contexts. Each entered into force at different historical moments but 
all have been in force long enough for significant state reporting histories to accumulate. In 
particular, the ICCPR—one of the conventions comprising the “international bill of rights”—
enables evaluation over four decades and a broad range of rights. The other three represent “single 
issue” conventions situated within a broader regime organized around their respective issues, ones 
that often stimulate specialized interest group attention.166 The CAT covers protections that touch 
on issues tied to national security and crime control (i.e., prisons and policing) and thus represents 
a hard case for the reporting process to influence policymakers. The CEDAW also represents a 
hard case in that it touches on culturally sensitive issues, but has a somewhat unique institutional 
history with a dedicated bureaucracy—now UN Women, the Secretariat of the Commission on the 
Status of Women—and active involvement by organized women’s rights NGOs. It is also the 
second most widely ratified international human rights instrument, behind the CRC, which is 
ratified by every member of the United Nations save the United States. Like CEDAW, the CRC 
also touches on sensitive public/private sphere issues and mobilizes highly organized children’s 
rights NGOs.  
 
164 Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & 
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The analysis is limited temporally given the data demands to make a persuasive case, with 
a cut-off date of December 2011 for CAT and December 2014 for ICCPR, CEDAW, and CRC 
(see Online Appendix A for a description of the data collection process, coverage, and coding 
procedure). This precludes discussion of the self-reporting process in light of recent critiques of 
the treaty body system and its budgetary crisis, but the conclusion offers thoughts on implications 
for the current political moment. 
Since self-reporting processes are complex and contextual, at times the empirical focus is 
limited to one region—Latin America. There are both practical and theoretical reasons for this 
choice. In practical terms, states in this region have in fact ratified the relevant conventions. Many 
were early parties and have committed to multiple agreements, providing a rich source of data. 
This contrasts with other regions, notably Asia and the Middle East, where governments have been 
more hesitant to ratify or have tended to do so with very broad reservations. While reservations do 
not preclude inclusion, ratification is a necessary condition for investigating the power of the 
report-and-review process. Further, Latin America is linguistically accessible, which allows for a 
deeper and more consistent qualitative examination of the posited mechanisms compared to a 
sampling of more countries with higher linguistic barriers. Tradeoffs are unavoidable; we have 
chosen to probe more deeply within a limited set of documents rather than attempt a broader but 
more superficial treatment.  
Latin America is also a theoretically appropriate sample for a number of reasons. Human 
rights violations historically have been a serious issue in Latin America and reporting has varied 
across countries, by treaty, and over time. This is by no means an “easy” region for demonstrating 
the plausible influence of self-reporting processes on outcomes. Nevertheless, the conditions for 
such influence seem present: there is at least a modicum of elite acceptance of and integration into 
international legal institutions. With relatively democratic institutions, active civil society, and (to 
varying degrees) meaningful press freedom, states across Latin America are plausible candidates 
to investigate the potential impact of the periodic review process on rights protections. 
 
Elite Socialization 
 
Socialization is the process through which people adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and 
behaviors that a group accepts and practices. It involves cognitive elements, such as mechanisms 
of persuasion that changes actors’ minds about facts, values, or norms; it also entails social 
influences, akin to peer pressure associated with the desire for social acceptance, which leverages 
praise, opprobrium, and other intangible rewards and punishments.167 In the context of periodic 
review, elite socialization refers to the process through which officials participating in the 
preparation, presentation, discussion, and follow-up associated with reporting come to understand 
what the international community (represented by committee experts) means by implementation 
of and compliance with treaty obligations. Socialization suggests that government officials may 
seek to gain this community’s acceptance and respect by demonstrating pro-social behaviors in 
words and actions. As such—and in contrast to learning, discussed below—socialization is an 
inherently intersubjective process. It depends on the interaction of the individual and the 
reference group, and denotes the process through which the former comes to adopt the norms 
and values of the latter.  
 
167 Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 487 
(2001). 
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Socialization theory assumes that elites are open to persuasion and/or peer pressure to 
conform to international standards. This seems plausible in the treaty-monitoring context. 
Participating in the constructive dialogue is consent-based, suggesting that no participant has a 
serious issue with the treaty body’s authority to undertake its review. States parties elect committee 
members purported to be independent experts of high moral character, who psychological studies 
find are viewed as more credible and under many circumstances more persuasive than non-
experts.168 The perceived authoritativeness may thus imbue expert committees with normative 
power to persuade.169 Social psychological research also suggests that persuasive attempts are 
more likely to be effective when conveyed in person rather than virtually or at a distance. 170 As 
an in-person and iterative process, government officials participating in periodic review are likely 
to find themselves in regular conversation with the committees, reinforcing socialization efforts 
and effects. At the very least, reporting generates discussion about treaty obligations’ meaning—
an integral part of the compliance process.171  
Criticism, disapproval, and even moderate shaming are also integral to socialization. These 
social cues alter the costs associated with disapproved behaviors, social psychological costs that 
socialization theories emphasize involve a desire for group acceptance.172 The treaty bodies aim 
to avoid aggressive and overt “naming and shaming” approaches in favor of tempered disapproval 
and constructive dialogue.173 Felice Gaer (who currently sits on the Committee Against Torture) 
notes the advantages of a “dialogue” over a “confrontation,” and that dialogue has generated better 
outcomes than the more confrontational approach of the former Human Rights Commission.174 To 
be sure, treaty bodies are clear about areas where states fall short and have failed to make progress. 
Such clarity furthers “[t]he very process of identifying, describing, and controlling human rights 
practices [which] helps the diffusion of the human rights discourse through global and local 
levels.”175 Committee reviews are made public, which not only diffuses compliance norms but 
potentially influences officials’ reputations as well.176 Even if initial participation in the report-
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and-review process is motivated by rote adoption of superficial “scripts of modernity,” it exposes 
governments to broader acculturation pressures for implementation and compliance.177 
Are government officials socialized to the reporting process and to international human 
rights norms more generally? Evidence can be found in the communicative process, in the form of 
(1) committee language consistent with socialization (praise and opprobrium in service of clear 
implementation standards), and (2) target engagement suggestive of increasing government 
understanding of the rules, norms, and purposes of reporting. The first implies that the committees 
communicate in a way that is plausibly persuasive; the second implies that the reporter 
communicates back: “I get it.” Empirically, we look for persuasive tone and language from 
committee members and higher quality, more thorough, and responsive reports from states over 
time.  
 
Committees’ Communicative Choices: Preparing the Conditions for Socialization 
 
Research on social persuasion suggests that language matters, and that persuasive 
communication must walk a fine line between normative clarity on the one hand and threatening 
or condescending language on the other.178 Cultivating trust also has a significant impact on the 
prospects for persuasion.179 While we do not have irrefutable causal proof that government elites 
have in fact become socialized by the periodic review process, we do demonstrate that the process 
displays theoretically necessary preconditions for socialization to occur and that it is thus 
conducive to that end.  
If committees are communicating in order to socialize, we would expect them to frame 
comments using respectful language, in order to elicit genuine consideration of their suggestions. 
To maximize the possibilities for persuasion, we should see committee members keeping 
discussions professional, as research consistently shows that perceived expertise is positively 
associated with persuasion.180 We would further expect that committee language stresses 
normative clarity, and evinces both back-patting and mild forms of criticism. To find evidence of 
socialization efforts, we examined in detail the history of committees’ communicative choices 
during constructive dialogues with five Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Uruguay), across the four core treaties on which this Article focuses (ICCPR, CEDAW, 
CAT, and CRC). 
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In the early years of the treaty-body system, committee members used formal, diplomatic, 
and often deferential language, particularly when discussing obligations that implicate national 
security or core societal norms or values. For example, during the Cold War the Human Rights 
Committee was rarely explicitly critical. It was not “uncommon for certain states, regardless of 
their human rights record, to be treated with ‘kid gloves.’”181 Members typically elaborated on the 
scope and interpretation of specific covenant provisions (cuing their expertise) and then requested 
further clarification about legislation to indirectly highlight where there might be inconsistencies 
with ICCPR provisions (mild shaming).182 The committee’s deft requests in 1980 for clarification 
of Colombia’s law and practices prior to cautiously worded suggestions provide one example.183 
There were undoubtedly exceptions in the early years, particularly for Latin American countries 
with military regimes or states of emergency. Stressing normative clarity, committee members 
could be quite blunt when they thought there was a significant gap between a state’s laws and 
international norms.184 
The diplomatic and indirect approach began to shift in the late 1980s, with committee 
members much more willing to identify directly inconsistencies between domestic law and treaty 
obligations. Over the 1990s, members increasingly drew attention to insufficient legal 
implementation. For instance, the CAT country rapporteur for Uruguay’s second review explicitly 
stated that the Penal Code’s two-year sentence for abuse of authority was “insufficient” in light of 
Article 2 of the convention.185 Another member noted an additional “contradiction” between the 
Penal Code’s inclusion of a due obedience defense and convention obligations and asked the 
delegation to “express its views on that contradiction.”186 Members were sometimes loath to 
explicitly identify violations in practice, but a few began to do so, often avoiding direct accusations 
by drawing attention to alleged incidents of non-compliance from NGO or U.S. State Department 
accounts and asking the representative to comment on them. Allegations of torture incidents in 
Argentina followed this pattern,187 followed by solicitous back-patting for the country’s 
commitment to preventing torture and improvements in other areas.188 This is evidence of the 
committees’ efforts to influence behavior through balanced concern and praise, while articulating 
what counts as compliance with treaty obligations. Prompting government agents to reflect and 
comment on implementation shortcomings represents a practice of “cuing,” a central tactic of 
persuasion.189 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a few committees grew increasingly 
confrontational, adopting tones that belied the notion of dialogue or persuasion. Confrontation 
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tempered somewhat by the early 2010s, when the character of committee dialogues became less 
accusatory and much more technical. States predominantly provided objective descriptions of 
laws, policies, and practices, and committee members underscored their expertise with near 
clinical assessments of (in)compatibility with treaty provisions, followed by detailed questions to 
point to shortcomings or to clarify the situation. Committee members frequently draw from reports 
by NGOs, the U.S. State Department, special procedures, regional human rights mechanisms, and 
other treaty bodies’ concluding observations to flag discrepancies with the state’s report and 
request clarification or comment.190  
Consistent with socialization theory, members telegraph their meaning using cooperative 
and problem-solving language, sometimes following up critical assessments (mild shaming) with 
assurances that we are here to help (identification and back-patting), and offering new or 
alternative approaches to address recognized shortcomings.191 During Chile’s most recent 
CEDAW review, Patricia Schultz (Switzerland) commended the creation of the Technical 
Secretariat for Gender Equality and Non-discrimination before noting that “action currently being 
taken to guarantee equal access to justice and protection against gender stereotyping remained 
either insufficient or insufficiently timely,” and suggesting that the Committee’s General 
Comment No. 3 “could provide useful guidance for addressing that situation.”192 A CAT 
Committee member expressed alarm at the large number of individuals in pre-trial detention in 
Colombia, stressing that the problem needed to be addressed “urgently and imaginatively,” 
employing alternatives to detention such as electronic bracelets and community service.193 In 
discussing Mexico’s new legislative efforts on detention registers, another CAT Committee 
member suggested that legislation include “robust mechanisms, such as the use of video recordings 
and Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment, to guard against the falsification of 
information.”194 
The normative strategy remains central: the word “should” appears frequently both during 
the dialogue and within the concluding observations. To be sure, questioning remains demanding 
and occasionally sharply critical. For example, Olivier de Frouville (France) began the second 
session of Colombia’s most recent review before the Human Rights Committee by noting that “the 
vagueness and evasiveness of the [delegation’s] replies . . . were making it difficult to engage in a 
truly constructive dialogue” and that the information provided by the government “shed relatively 
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little light on the state of implementation of the Covenant on the ground.”195 A CAT Committee 
member characterized Argentina’s recent proposed amendments to its criminal sentence 
enforcement legislation as making “a mockery of the notion, enshrined in the Constitution, that 
serving a sentence was a form of rehabilitation.”196 Overall, however, there appears to have been 
a clear shift to less politicized language by the 2010s, in line with many theories of persuasive 
communication. Of course there is room for improvement: a number of government comments in 
the context of the 2020 treaty body review note that the current process seems more like a “‘one-
way dialogue’ that resembled an appearance before a court”197 than a genuine dialogue, leading to 
a “frustrated feeling of not having been heard.”198 Such experiences may hamper elite 
socialization, a point to which we return in the conclusion. 
 
Socialization in Practice: Taking Reporting Seriously? 
 
Have states become socialized to take their procedural obligations under treaties seriously? 
Treaty bodies have set a public normative expectation that governments submit timely, responsive, 
and transparent reports. Committees repeatedly and vigorously praise quality reports and express 
disappointment at delayed submissions or reports that fail to conform to guidelines.199 This is how 
social norms are created and transmitted.  
To find out whether states have become socialized into these reporting expectations, we 
read all state reports (not just those for Latin America) submitted under four core human rights 
treaties—ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC. Each was assigned a Quality Score, based on the 
government’s willingness to recognize shortcomings in implementation or compliance and to 
outline specific measures or efforts to address them (see Online Appendix A for the coding 
procedure). Figure 1 shows the average quality scores for reports submitted under each treaty over 
time. Improvements in report quality vary noticeably across treaties. The earliest reports were not 
forthcoming in acknowledging shortcomings, but with the partial exception of CRC and ICCPR 
reports in more recent years, they systematically improved in candor and transparency over time.  
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Figure 1. Average report quality scores across four core human rights treaties. Average quality 
scores assigned to all reports in a given year as a proportion of the total score a report could receive 
(0–1). Report quality scores available for: ICCPR (1977–2014); CEDAW (1982–2014); CAT 
(1988–2011); and CRC (1992–2014). See Online Appendix A for details on the coding instrument 
and procedure. 
 
Elite socialization also implies that governments become increasingly responsive to 
committee concerns. To evaluate this expectation, we assigned all reports (except initial reports) 
submitted under the same four core human rights treaties a Responsiveness Score, based on how 
well the report engaged with the committee’s previous concluding observations (see Online 
Appendix A for the coding procedure). Figure 2 shows state reports have become more responsive 
to committee recommendations and concerns over time, though ICCPR reports tend to be 
relatively less so than those under the other three treaties. This shift was reinforced in the 2010s 
by the institutional reform of moving to the simplified reporting procedure.200 Steady 
improvements in responsiveness provide indirect evidence that elite socialization to international 
norms is at work. 
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Figure 2. Average report responsiveness scores across four core human rights treaties. Average 
responsiveness scores are assigned to all subsequent reports in a given year as a proportion of the 
total score a report could receive (0–1). Report responsiveness scores available for: ICCPR (1978–
2014); CEDAW (1991–2014); CAT (1992–2011); CRC (1997–2014). See Online Appendix A for 
details on the coding instrument and procedure. 
 
Finally, we expect governments to genuinely deliberate during the constructive dialogue. 
Evidence points to language of both deliberative engagement as well as resistance during these 
reviews. Examples of genuine engagement include Uruguay’s explicit recognition that it needed 
to align its legal system with the CAT and its openness to the committee’s recommendations for 
how to do so.201 Similarly, Argentina told the Committee Against Torture that it considered its 
definition of torture “sufficiently broad to cover the requirements of the Convention” but that 
“it remained open to suggestions from the Committee in that regard.”202 Before the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, an Argentine delegation “did not deny that . . . domestic legislation ran 
counter to some of the recommendations set forth by the Committee,” then reminded the 
committee of recent developments in case law.203 Mexico accepted a CEDAW Committee 
member’s observation that a discriminatory culture in the government remained a primary obstacle 
to gender equality in politics, and committed to develop programs to help promote women at all 
levels of government.204 More recently, the Mexican delegation acknowledged the same 
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committee’s concern that “much remained to be done to improve conditions for women in 
detention.”205 
Clearly, states resist as well, particularly regarding matters that touch on national security 
or core societal norms and values. An Argentine representative resisted a suggestion to review the 
government’s criminalization of abortion.206 Chilean representatives were particularly defensive 
during the military government’s first review by the Human Rights Committee, noting that “some 
members of the Committee had made highly politicized statements which had been repeated many 
times in other forums.”207 Such a statement demonstrates the limits of politicized shaming in this 
setting; the committees themselves have returned to more professionalized assessments. 
We can draw several conclusions from this exploration of the reporting process. First, it is 
a process in which elite socialization—the gradual adoption of the norms, values, attitudes, and 
behaviors accepted and practiced by a group—is possible.208 Since confrontation and harsh 
excoriation are likely to lead to backlash, treaty bodies are often careful to maintain a respectful 
posture toward states parties, using diplomatic and increasingly technical language. Problem-
solving language is common, suggesting an effort to cultivate a cooperative relationship while 
inculcating international procedural and substantive norms. Second, the quality and responsiveness 
of state reports represents evidence that (some) states are becoming socialized into international 
norms of accountability. 
 
 Learning and Capacity Building 
 
Learning Best Practices 
 
The report-and-review process is a dialogue—not an exam and certainly not a trial.209 It is 
an opportunity for states to learn about best implementation practices or more efficient and 
effective methods to improve treaty outcomes. When review and dialogue accompany self-
reporting, opportunities arise for state and international elites to “learn more about one another’s 
position and perspectives, desires and constraints.”210 Learning exactly how to implement one’s 
treaty obligations is thus a highly plausible explanation for the correlation between cumulative 
reporting activity and rights improvements. 
Implementing accepted norms—discussed above in the context of socialization—requires 
knowledge. Even if we all affirm that torture is “bad,” people of goodwill might not know how to 
keep it from happening. Even if we all agree that child labor is deplorable and not in a child’s 
immediate interest or the long-run interest of a society, it is not altogether clear how to reduce it 
when families need the extra income. Fair trials may be widely embraced in principle, but it is not 
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immediately obvious how to better ensure them in practice (and often with limited resources). This 
sort of learning is often factual and experiential, drawing heavily on a logic of consequences (“what 
works”).  
In this sense, self-reporting resembles a type of global experimentalist governance that 
frames global issues in a rather open-ended way: how can women’s rights be strengthened? What 
forms of police training have the best shot at reducing torture in detention centers? The 
constructive dialogue attempts to solve such problems in light of locally generated knowledge and 
experiences, thereby contributing to localized efforts to improve capacity and compliance. 
Information has a major impact on political and policy behavior.211 Learning from other 
states’ experiences or from international organizations plays a central role in domestic regulatory 
practice212 as well as the diffusion of social and economic policies globally.213 Learning is 
voluntary, purposive, and involves seeking out information to help solve a problem based on an 
improved understanding of what policies lead to better outcomes.214 Multilateral reporting regimes 
often engender transnational networks involved in common implementation and compliance 
problems.215 In this sense, self-reporting is less a mea culpa and more a part of what Charles F. 
Sabel and others call “global experimental governance,” itself a response to conditions of 
ignorance and uncertainty.216 
Both governments and the treaty bodies themselves can be expected to learn from the 
report-and-review process.217 As Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes argue, learning 
processes are central to eliciting treaty compliance and effectiveness.218 As early as 1953, the 
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United States proposed that the goal of periodic review should be to “allow countries to draw 
inspiration and guidance from the experiences of other countries when trying to solve their own 
problems.”219 Indeed, treaty bodies explicitly intend to convey the experience they have acquired 
in their examination of other reports.220 The treaty bodies draw on collective experiences and 
information from myriad sources to expand knowledge available to governments and publics.221 
States gain advice about modes of implementation not previously known or considered. Learning 
is a shorter-term mechanism than elite socialization, though similarly iterative. Iterative reporting 
builds on learning opportunities to improve policies and practices over time.222 
Records of the review process provide clear evidence that teaching and learning is a prime 
goal of the committee members. The constructive dialogues and concluding observations are 
replete with suggestions found to be effective elsewhere. For example, during Chile’s first review 
before the Human Rights Committee, Christian Tomuschat (Federal Republic of Germany) noted 
that “[e]xperience from other countries showed that workers had to be organized at the national 
level if they were to be successful in defending their interests.”223 In reviewing Chile’s most recent 
report before the CEDAW Committee, Marion Bethel (the Bahamas) suggested the government 
might consider prosecuting human traffickers under anti-money-laundering laws, noting that the 
“Argentinian authorities had recently begun to move in that direction.”224 Learning best practices 
is similarly a goal for a number of governments who view the self-reporting process as an 
opportunity to “help strengthen domestic implementation by identifying areas of good practice”225 
and to “shar[e] best practice examples.”226 
The committees’ highly visible General Comments further reinforce learning and sharing 
of best practices.227 In fact, this is their intended purpose.228 General Comments are used to “share 
best practices with states parties, identify barriers to the enjoyment of Covenant rights, and to 
provide information on how rights violations may be prevented.”229 For example, the Human 
Rights Committee’s General Comment on freedoms of opinion and expression drew from over 
one hundred concluding observations and individual communications to elaborate legislative 
models for treaty implementation.230  
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This Article does not offer direct proof that participants have learned specific best practices 
from interacting with the treaty bodies. Learning—and especially self-regulated learning—is 
difficult to measure, even in well-controlled settings with calibrated instruments designed to do 
so.231 Nothing approaching a rigorous study of bureaucratic learning has been accomplished in the 
human rights literature. Rather, our focus is on whether the right conditions for learning are present 
during the report and review process.  
To investigate this question, we looked to the composition of government delegations sent 
to Geneva—and specifically delegates’ connections with relevant domestic lawmaking and 
implementing organs—as a feature likely to improve the chances of carrying lessons back home. 
Latin American delegations to the treaty bodies were examined for the ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT, 
and CRC over the past decade. Governments typically send over a dozen officials with diverse 
levels and types of expertise. A handful are permanent diplomats in Geneva who are unlikely to 
return home with useful lessons on implementation. However, governments frequently send 
individuals from ministries and agencies tasked with implementing specific treaty obligations. For 
the CAT and ICCPR, representatives typically include both high-level officials and civil servants 
working in human rights departments from a country’s Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign 
Relations, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of the Interior. Delegations often include individuals 
from the judiciary, senators, police chiefs, and a country’s NHRI. For CEDAW, many of the same 
types of officials show up in Geneva, but they are typically led by a high-level official from a 
National Institute/Council of Women (Argentina and Mexico), the Ministry for Women and 
Gender Equity, the National Service for Women and Gender Equity (Chile), or similar institutions. 
Likewise, CRC delegations include policymakers and civil servants from agencies that deal 
specifically with youth planning and rights of the child.  
The conditions for networked learning linked to domestic institutions and groups appear 
particularly ripe. Domestic bureaucracies, inter-governmental agencies, and civil society 
organizations have been found to interact within international institutions in complex ways,232 and 
in doing so act as transmission belts of knowledge flowing from the discussions with experts. This 
conception of networked learning sees the reporting process as less of a do-as-you’re-told scolding 
and more of an opportunity to educate parties, experts, and civil society about treaty obligations 
and implementation difficulties.  
 
Development of Capacity to Implement 
 
Learning is not simply about acquiring knowledge, but further involves the development 
of legal, technical, and institutional capacities to take action. The self-reporting process prompts a 
government to collect and share information it might not otherwise have gathered, thereby 
promoting self-assessment capacity.233 The capacity to conduct a self-assessment potentially 
brings more critical eyes to the status quo,234 ultimately revealing previously unnoticed gaps in 
 
231 See Philip H. Winne & Nancy E. Perry, Measuring Self-Regulated Learning, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-
REGULATION 531(Monique Boekaerts, Moshe Zeidner & Paul R. Pintrich eds., 1999). 
232 See Betsi Beem, Leaders in Thinking, Laggards in Attention? Bureaucratic Engagement in International 
Arenas, 37 POL’Y STUD. J. 497 (2009); Diane Stone, Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and 
Their Networks, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 19 (2008). 
233 Walter Kälin, Examination of State Reports, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY, 
supra note 219, at 16, 39. 
234 Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik, supra note 215, at 18.  
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rights protections.235 Raised expectations that specific types of information should be produced 
may further generate pressure for more transparency about the state of treaty implementation.  
State reports reveal some capacity development over time. In addition to the general 
increase in quality and responsiveness documented above, governments have made greater effort 
to collect increasingly specific and disaggregated statistics relevant to treaty obligations.236 To 
confirm this, we coded every state report—not just those for Latin America—submitted under the 
ICCPR, CAT, CEDAW, and CRC, for whether or not they contain meaningful numerical data 
(Figure 3), by which we mean statistics about outcomes relevant to treaty obligations.237 Gathering 
data is only a first, albeit important, step. Such longitudinal quantitative data are important because 
they contribute to assessing a problem’s extent, any improvements, and backsliding.   
 
 
Figure 3. Average report data scores across four core human rights treaties. Average data scores 
assigned to all reports in a given year as a proportion of the total score a report could receive (0–
1).  
 
Many government bureaucracies initially did not report statistical information relevant to 
implementation, most noticeably for civil and political rights and the ban against torture. Yet the 
trend for reporting statistical information has increased steadily over the years. In 1990, fewer than 
 
235 The United Nations sees detecting shortcomings as one of periodic review’s major purposes. See International 
Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to Be Submitted by States 
Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, para. 5, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 (June 3, 2006). 
236 The international community adopted specific norms about using indicators to measure progress in human 
rights in 1993, though only in the area of economic social and cultural rights. World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Art. 98, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). 
237 Unfortunately, there is no way to know whether the data are accurate, so we cannot make claims about quality. 
See Online Appendix A for data collection and coding procedures for all four treaties. 
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10 percent of reports to the Human Rights Committee contained quantitative information. There 
is a clear upward trend between approximately 1995 and 2005, followed by variability in the past 
decade. Some data provision is nearly universal in CEDAW and CRC reports. While we cannot 
speak to the accuracy of the statistics provided in reports, the trend may suggest a capacity to 
collect and organize comparable information. One advantage for including data at all is that it can 
be systematically contested by civil society and other skeptics. It also has uses beyond treaty 
implementation.238 Efforts to collect data are important for assessing the breadth of a problem and 
the extent to which it is being addressed over time. 
While it is appropriate to be skeptical of government-generated human rights data, its 
production is not always entirely unsupervised. The OHCHR has been central in assisting the 
development of information-collection capacities. It trains officials to use its Human Rights 
Indicators guide to collect data in areas from health, water, and sanitation to education and fair 
trials.239 The OHCHR treaty-body capacity-building program established in 2015 similarly 
organizes training workshops that focus on treaty-body reporting and data collection 
methodologies.240 Learning and capacity development are thus plausible channels for the positive 
correlations earlier research established between participating in self-reporting and rights 
improvements.  
 
Public Attention  
 
Self-reporting is not secretive. It is an acknowledged treaty obligation with potential for 
public participation and contestation. At least some negotiators intended self-reporting to move 
discussions about human rights from the halls of Geneva to civil society, the media, and eventually 
the state’s legislative chambers, national courts, and executive agencies. Implementation 
committees also stress governments’ obligation to raise awareness about human rights and to 
disseminate committee recommendations among the population at large.241 Public attention to the 
report-and-review process may be another key reason that self-reporting correlates with rights 
improvements.  
 
Publicity, Information, and Accountability 
 
Many theories of international legal compliance rely implicitly on the availability—
particularly to domestic publics—of information about government activities and legal 
obligations. Information produced by international bodies informs domestic audiences about their 
government’s (non-)compliance, allowing domestic constituencies to hold government officials 
accountable.242 Quantitative observational evidence, case studies, and experimental studies of 
 
238 John D. Huber & Nolan McCarty, Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, & Political Reform, 98 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 481 (2004). 
239 Human Rights Council, 27th Sess., Report of the OHCHR: Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building 
Options for Integrating Human Rights into National Policies, para. 44, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/41 (July 24, 2014); 
OHCHR, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation, UN Doc. HR/PUB/12/5 (2012). 
240 Human Rights Council, 35th Sess., Report of the OHCHR: Progress and Challenges Encountered in the Main 
Activities Aimed at Enhancing Technical Cooperation and Capacity-Building Undertaken Since the Establishment of 
the Human Rights Council, para. 51, UN Doc. A/HRC/35/20 (May 3, 2017). 
241 Human Rights Committee, 80th Sess., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 7, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (adopted Mar. 29, 2004). 
242 XINYUAN DAI, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL POLICIES (2007). 
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public opinion all suggest that human rights treaties raise domestic groups’ expectations that they 
can demand treaty compliance.243  
International conventions are central in generating and publicly disseminating both 
normative and empirical information. Normatively, treaties are focal instruments for public 
audiences in the sense that they are nearly universally ratified statements of the international 
community’s values relating to human rights. Experimental evidence suggests that agreements 
framed as the product of consensus are more likely to garner public support.244 Even though 
treaties are sometimes ratified cynically,245 they do shape understandings of what is and is not 
acceptable human rights behavior. Their formality further enhances their ability to influence the 
public’s normative understandings and expectations.246  
The report-and-review exercise is an extended and visible revelation of what the treaty 
requires. Through their concluding observations, committees inform the public about the 
normative definition of human rights obligations, such as, for example, what torture is.247 Self-
reporting also reveals empirical information. It generates details on legislation, statistics on 
prisoner abuses, infant mortality rates, school enrollment figures disaggregated by gender, and 
employment and wage discrimination. Importantly, the reporting process elicits nongovernmental 
sources of information from civil society, various UN agencies, and special rapporteurs.  
 
Mobilizing Civil Society Organizations 
 
By mobilizing and empowering groups within and outside of government, reporting can 
have a catalytic effect in promoting internal policy reform. A number of states consult with non-
governmental organizations in the preparation of their periodic reports. Committees’ concluding 
recommendations further provide domestic constituencies with information to evaluate their 
state’s treaty compliance, focusing domestic pressure on the government to perform better. Even 
when states are less than forthright, their reports contain information nonstate actors can assess 
and contest.248 Examples abound, from Southeast Asia249 to South Asia250 to Nigeria.251 
The process of reporting and responding has elicited significant public attention over time. 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are increasingly involved in the reporting process itself. Civil 
society “shadow reports” are an effort to give voice to facts and views that may not be reflected in 
 
243 SIMMONS, supra note 6; Adam S. Chilton, The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 171 
J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 181 (2015); Sarah E. Kreps & Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law, Military 
Effectiveness, and Public Support for Drone Strikes, 53 J. PEACE RES. 830 (2016); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, 
International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2013). 
244 Tyler Johnson & Victoria Rickard, United Nations, Uniting Nations: International Support Cues and American 
Attitudes on Environmental Sustainability, 98 SOC. SCI. Q. 876 (2017). 
245 See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588 
(2007); James Raymond Vreeland, Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture, 62 INT’L ORG. 65 (2008). 
246 JAMES D. MORROW, ORDER WITHIN ANARCHY: THE LAWS OF WAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION 17 
(2014). 
247 See, e.g., Committee Against Torture, 36th Sess., Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee 
Against Torture: United States, para. 13, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).  
248 Jacqui True, Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy, 5 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 368 (2003) (stressing 
the importance of treaties as focal points for women’s groups lobbying). 
249 See The Cambodian NGO Committee on CEDAW, About Us, at http://ngocedaw.org/?page_id=7. 
250 See the work of Partners for Law in Development at http://cedawsouthasia.org. 
251 See, e.g., International Federation for Human Rights, The Nigeria NGO Coalition Shadow Report to the 
CEDAW Committee (July 31, 2008), at http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a0007a2.html. 
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the governments’ reports. They are publicly available and have been posted on the OHCHR’s 
website reliably since around 2007 (2009 for the CRC). Figure 4 charts patterns in shadow reports 
per state report for four core treaties over time, effectively measuring the intensification of 
public—and increasingly domestic—scrutiny of states reports.252  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average shadow reporting per state report submission under four core human rights 
treaties (all states). 
 
 
NHRIs have weighed in since about 2011 as well. In some cases, there is a dramatic 
increase in this form of public mobilization around the reporting process, especially for the ICCPR 
and CEDAW, and a detectable increase for the CAT and CRC as well. If anything, Figure 4 
understates the degree of civil society mobilization around the reporting process because many 
reports are authored in the name of a broad coalition of local organizations. Notably, 
implementation committees have begun to consider CSO reports even when states themselves fail 
to report, underscoring the value of public engagement with implementation. As trends in shadow 
reporting indicate, domestic civil society mobilization around human rights reporting has 
intensified over time, complementing earlier claims about domestic bureaucratic capacity building. 
 
252 By “domestic CSOs” we mean organizations based in-country that take primary responsibility for compiling 
the report, even if assisted by an international nongovernmental organization. By contrast, “international CSOs” 
operate on a (near-)global scale. 
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Many civil society reports expose serious violations. Domestic CSOs revealed abuses of 
women in prisons at the hands of male prison staff to the CEDAW Committee, an issue the 
Argentine state report scarcely noted.253 In the case of the CAT, Ecuador’s 2009 report spurred the 
submission of a shadow report from the local Foundation for Integral Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Violence, detailing ill-treatment in detention that conflicted with the government’s account.254 
These inconsistencies were in turn echoed in the Committee Against Torture’s concluding 
observations.255 Despite the central role civil society plays in the report-and-review process, 
overreliance on often unverified information has sparked criticism in the context of the 2020 treaty 
body review.256 Some suggest that the unbalanced use of shadow reports could “create an 
ambience of mistrust between Treaty Bodies and Member States.”257 Such overreliance potentially 
undermines the effectiveness of previously discussed socialization and learning mechanisms, 
given that trust likely influences information processing and persuasion.258  
 
Media Attention 
 
Broader societal mobilization depends at least initially on publicly available information 
that self-reporting has taken place and the issues on which it focused. This section does not prove 
that media attention has always led to rights improvements, but it does show that such conditions 
for public accountability have emerged around the report and review process. Again, we look to 
Latin America and two treaties (CEDAW and CAT) for evidence that this process seeps into local 
news sources.259  
Figure 5 demonstrates a spike in local press attention to the review processes during the 
year of review (year 0) for the aggregate of all Latin American countries searched. Moreover, 
media attention to the reporting process continues after the formal review concludes. In the year 
following review, the press continues to report on treaty implementation and committee 
recommendations, compared with the years prior to review. For both the CEDAW and the CAT, 
 
253 Joint CSO Submission, Women’s Human Rights: Argentine State Pending Debts, Alternative Report from 
Civil Society Organizations in Connection with the Submission of the Sixth Periodic Report of the States Parties 
(CEDAW/C/ARG/6) to the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 46th 
Period of Sessions (Argentina, 2010), available at 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/ARG/INT_CEDAW_NGO_ARG_46_7960_E.
pdf. 
254 Committee Against Torture, Forty-fifth Sess., Summary Record of the 966th Mtg. (Nov. 9, 2010), para. 65, 
UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.966 (Nov. 16, 2010). 
255 Committee Against Torture, 45th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Ecuador, 
para. 16, UN Doc. CAT/C/ECU/CO/4-6 (Dec. 7, 2010).  
256 See, e.g., OHCHR, Reply of the Republic of Armenia to the OHCHR Questionnaire on Implementation of GA 
Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Armenia.docx; 
OHCHR, Response by China to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Resolution 68/268, at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/China.doc; OHCHR, Submission from 
Singapore to the Questionnaire in Relation to General Assembly Resolution 68/268 on “Strengthening and Enhancing 
the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System,” at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Singapore.docx; OHCHR, Thailand’s 
Submission for the Questionnaire in Relation to General Assembly Resolution 68/268, at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Thailand.docx. 
257 OHCHR, Contribution by the Government of Bulgaria to Questionnaire in Relation to General Assembly 
Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Bulgaria.doc. 
258 Légal, Chappé, Coiffard & Villard-Forest, supra note 179 and corresponding text. 
259 See Online Appendix B for details on the coding scheme and data collection process. 
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the results peak as expected, most strongly for Mexico, but stories in the Venezuelan and Chilean 
press are also strongly clustered for the CEDAW. Colombia and Argentina press coverage is 
similarly strong for the CAT review process. Content analysis of these articles reveals that they 
frequently are critical of government implementation and often draw attention to Committee 
recommendations.260 What is discussed in Geneva does not necessarily stay in Geneva.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Domestic media coverage of CEDAW and CAT review in Latin America. Average 
number of domestic newspaper articles that reference the in-person periodic review and/or 
concluding observations issued by the committee. Total articles within each country’s searchable 
time period were summed and averaged across publications. Articles are centered on the year of 
review (0). Coverage of CAT in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; 
and of CEDAW in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
 
Contributing to Law Development 
 
Finally, we consider a legal means by which the report-and-review process improves 
human rights: through judicial decision making. Self-reporting and the role of courts are 
complements rather than substitutes,261 as the negotiators who designed the CERD reporting 
 
260 Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights, supra note 2, at 57–60; 
Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.  
261 Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 97 
(2012). 
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provisions understood.262 The synergy between reporting and review on the one hand and 
adjudicatory mechanisms of international human rights enforcement on the other is clear. For one 
thing, the commitment to reporting is empirically consistent with a willingness to be bound to the 
rule of law through quasi-adjudication (i.e., the individual complaint process). There is a strong 
positive correlation, for example, between declaring one’s state bound by CAT Article 22 (an 
optional obligation that gives individuals a right to petition for a rule-based decision of the 
Committee Against Torture) and the likelihood of rendering a high-quality state report.263 Indeed, 
an Article 22 commitment is a much stronger predictor of turning in a report than is the propensity 
to torture itself.264  
Furthermore, the treaty bodies themselves render decisions and views that inform and 
reinforce the jurisprudence of courts. Not only are reporting and adjudication consistent, there is 
substantial evidence of mutuality between these systems. The self-reporting regime contributes to 
judicial decision making and vice versa. A recent study of domestic court decisions found 
numerous citations to state reports, shadow reports, or committee recommendations, suggesting 
their usefulness in domestic law enforcement.265 They have also been helpful in contributing to 
regional human rights enforcement.266 
To illustrate the contribution of self-reporting to law development, we searched the case 
law of both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the InterAmerican Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) for every reference to a general comment, individual complaints decision, 
concluding observation, or state report for the oldest six core human rights treaties: CERD, ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and the CRC. Not only are documents from the report-and-review 
process useful for establishing fact patterns in domestic cases, they are becoming common as 
sources for law elaboration in regional human rights courts. The doctrines developed in these 
regional courts, in turn, plausibly help to enforce rights on the ground. 
 
The ECtHR 
 
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber frequently references concluding observations, general 
comments, and individual communications within its judgments, as seen in Figure 6. Many of 
these references appear in the judgment’s section outlining “Relevant International Law and 
Practice” and consist of quotations of relevant committee interpretations contained within 
concluding observations and individual complaint decisions. By identifying concluding 
observations as relevant law, the Court reaffirms that the treaty bodies develop international legal 
standards that inform and reinforce its own case law. Indeed, the Court makes an effort to note 
when treaty body interpretations are in line with Strasbourg case law, such as when it decided to 
follow the “case law” of the Human Rights Committee for ICCPR Article 26 (on discrimination), 
 
262 UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86.  
263 Although individual communication decisions are not formally binding as a matter of international law, some 
domestic courts and national laws have sought to make specific orders/reparations enforceable domestically. See 
Koldo Casla, Supreme Court of Spain: UN Treaty Body Individual Decisions Are Legally Binding, EJIL:TALK! (Aug. 
1, 2018), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/supreme-court-of-spain-un-treaty-body-individual-decisions-are-legally-
binding. 
264 Creamer & Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights, supra note 26, at 596. 
265 Saunders, supra note 261. 
266 See, e.g., Angelika Nußberger, The ECtHR’s Use of Decisions of International Courts and Quasi-judicial 
Bodies, in JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 419, 430 (Amrei Müller ed., 2017).  
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which is similar to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention.267 In addition, both 
concurring and dissenting opinions have drawn heavily on the treaty bodies’ normative output to 
establish applicable international law standards and to help clarify the legal reasoning in the 
majority judgment.268  
 
 
 
Figure 6. European Court of Human Rights. References to individual communications, general 
comments, and concluding observations from the report-and-review process for the CERD, 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC as a proportion of total Grand Chamber judgments. 
 
Sometimes the ECtHR draws directly on treaty body views when developing its own, 
region-specific legal principles enforceable on European countries. In Stoll v. Switzerland, the 
Court drew from the language found within the Human Rights Committee’s concluding 
observations on a United Kingdom report to determine whether Switzerland’s interference with 
freedom of expression pursued a legitimate aim under Convention Article 10(2).269 It held that the 
concepts of national security and public safety “need to be applied with restraint and to be 
interpreted restrictively,” citing the Human Rights Committee’s concluding observations as falling 
“along the same lines.”270 Similarly, in Maslov v. Austria the Court drew from a Committee on the 
Rights of the Child general comment and concluding observations on Austria’s report to stress that 
the “obligation to take the best interests of the child into account includes an obligation to facilitate 
his or her reintegration” into society.271 
 
 
267 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2009-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 273, para. 55. 
268 See, e.g., Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1; Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Joined by Judge Vučinić, De Souza Ribeiro v. France, 
2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 139; Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges de Gaetano, Pinto de Albuquerque, Wojtyczek and 
Dedov, Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, 2017 Eur. Ct. H.R. 54. 
269 Stoll v. Switzerland, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 205. 
270 Id., para. 54; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, para. 21, UN Doc. 
CCPR/CO/73/UK (Dec. 6, 2001).  
271 Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, para. 82.  
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The IACtHR 
 
The IACtHR cites a range of committees’ general comments and concluding observations 
even more frequently than does the ECtHR (Figure 7).272  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. References to individual communications, 
general comments, state reports, and dialogue/concluding observations from the report-and-review 
process for the CERD, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC as a proportion of total 
judgments. 
 
In a case challenging Costa Rica’s prohibition of in vitro fertilization, for example, the 
Court drew from the Human Rights Committee’s and the CEDAW Committee’s concluding 
observations and comments to help interpret whether Convention Article 4(1) on the right to life 
requires the absolute protection of the embryo. Citing twenty-two separate concluding 
observations, it noted how the Human Rights Committee understands “the right to life of the 
mother is violated when laws that restrict access to abortion force women to resort to unsafe 
abortion, exposing them to death.” This interpretation permitted the Court to “state that an absolute 
protection of the prenatal life or the life of the embryo cannot be inferred from the ICCPR.”273 It 
similarly referenced CEDAW Committee concluding observations to establish that a “total ban on 
abortion, as well as its criminalization under certain circumstances, violates the provisions of 
[CEDAW].”274 This judgment further refined and reaffirmed the Court’s reproductive health 
jurisprudence to synergistically influence national case law in the region.275 
 
272 Neuman, supra note 122, at 111 (arguing that this process may undermine the legitimacy of law that states in 
the Americas have not explicitly agreed to).  
273 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, para. 226, n. 355 (Nov. 28, 2012). 
274 Id., para. 228. 
275 Johanna B. Fine, Katherine Mayall, and Lilian Sepulveda, The Role of International Human Rights Norms in 
the Liberalization of Abortion Laws Globally, 19 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 69 (2017). 
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The IACtHR also pointed to interpretations of the treaty bodies in the area of civil and 
political rights. Concluding observations have informed the Court’s findings on the incompatibility 
of amnesty laws for serious human rights violations with international law276 and the risk to human 
rights of permitting military units to act as judicial police.277 In a case involving the lethal use of 
force against Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic, the Court drew from concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee and Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination regarding the government’s treatment of such migrants to support a finding that 
there was de facto discrimination that led to a violation of their rights.278 Similarly, it drew from 
observations and recommendations by these two committees on Chile’s Counter-Terrorism Act to 
support its finding that the government was disproportionately applying it to members of the 
Mapuche indigenous people, in violation of their right to equal protection.279 It also directly 
incorporated recommendations of treaty bodies. In a case involving the death of 107 suspected 
MS-13 gang members in a Honduran prison, the Court ordered reparations that included 
recommendations made by the committees for ICCPR, CAT, and CRC to modify or repeal the 
Penal Code’s definition and application of the offense of unlawful association.280 This case in 
particular helped develop the Court’s relatively sparse jurisprudence on organized crime by 
requiring greater specificity on the offense of unlawful association in domestic criminal laws, an 
issue likely to appear with greater frequency before the Court in future years.281  
 These citations do not, of course, prove that states comply readily with these institutions 
in all cases. Rather, they demonstrate the mutually reinforcing jurisprudential relationship that 
plausibly strengthens and clarifies the rule of law. Existing studies have provided the causal and 
contextual evidence of state compliance with the decisions of international and regional courts.282 
Some studies suggest that law development and mobilization mechanisms may in fact interact,283 
since compliance with regional courts often depends on the political will to abide by these 
institutions’ decisions.284 To the extent that the report and review process elaborates standards that 
inform the decisions of regional and other courts, the causal pathway from reporting to improved 
human rights practice is strengthened. Judicial decision making is thus another important 
mechanism that helps explain the relationship between regular reporting and better human rights 
outcomes overall.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has explored four mechanisms through which state self-reporting can lead to 
positive consequences. Elite socialization, learning and capacity development, domestic political 
mobilization, and law development all plausibly explain the correlation between iterative reporting 
and improvements in human rights. The central contribution has been to demonstrate that 
improved human rights practices on the ground are theoretically and evidentiarily connected to the 
report and review process. Existing research has shown there is a statistically significant 
relationship between cumulative participation in the report and review process for the case of the 
CEDAW285 and the CAT.286 These four mechanisms help explain this relationship. Moreover, 
evidence from the self-reporting process itself underscores that it can be meaningful. In this sense, 
the “proof” of a causal relationship between reporting on the one hand and improvement in rights 
outcomes on the other lies in a careful examination of how the process unfolds and strengthens 
socialization, learning, political mobilization, and legal rules and standards.  
In this final Part we consider possible unintended consequences of human rights self-
reporting and highlight policy recommendations.  
 
Good Intentions with Unintended Consequences? 
 
A finding that self-reporting “works”—even when states have an incentive to shirk and 
prevaricate—will strike some observers as hopelessly naïve. Critics look at the proliferation of 
treaty obligations and assert that the reporting system is breaking under its own unwieldy 
weight.287 “Reporting fatigue” is a common diagnosis of the problem 288 and a major reason for 
reporting delinquency.289 But evidence of serious reporting fatigue is weak. Failure to report is 
best explained by a lack of state capacity, not by the weight of the requirements. In fact, research 
demonstrates that the more human rights treaties a state becomes party to, the more likely it is to 
turn in a report, which does not support a theory of fatigue.290 Similarly, reporting in one time 
period does not reduce the probability of doing so later, as ought to be the case if fatigue contributes 
to reporting delinquency.291  
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None of the qualitative reporting patterns we discussed above fit a “fatigue” profile. 
Reports are generally of demonstrably higher quality over time, increasingly responsive to the 
treaty bodies, and consistently provide relevant data. In fact, a closer look at the reports themselves 
shows that their quality improves as more reports are turned in. This pattern is not consistent with 
reporting fatigue. But to the extent that states are tired of rendering multiple reports, reforms aim 
to address such concerns through a single Common Core Document for all treaty bodies, 
harmonized reporting guidelines, and the simplified reporting procedure.292 Fatigue is not 
fundamental to a self-reporting system; many issues can be streamlined and simplified. Indeed, a 
number of reforms proposed as part of the 2020 treaty body review process aim to do just that. 
Perhaps a more insidious critique is that reporting may become a bureaucratized end in 
itself. The goal of this entire exercise is ultimately to improve human rights,293 not to collect 
reports, write recommendations, or even improve the compliance rate with concluding 
observations per se. When bureaucrats focus on the procedures of reporting they risk falling prey 
to “regulatory ritualism,” a phrase used to characterize rote adherence to institutionalized 
procedures while losing focus on rights outcomes themselves.294 Treaty-body periodic review risks 
fetishizing submission of reports to the detriment of improvements in human rights practices on 
the ground.295  
It is thus crucial to understand how and why self-reporting and review produce results. The 
magnitude of such effects is modest, but clearly detectable. The self-reporting process is 
evolutionary, not revolutionary, and is certainly one part of a wider ecosystem of human rights 
accountability. But research demonstrates that repeat participation in the process sometimes results 
in important improvements.296 Moreover, the proof—the why and the how—is in the process: 
engagement quality is improving, not declining. Ritualism may be a risk, but even actors who think 
they are engaged in ritual may be socialized into meaningful dialogue. This Article has 
demonstrated that eager publics and alert press reporters have not permitted the process to become 
meaninglessly performative across the board.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
Self-reporting systems are dynamic and change over time. They start low-key but implicitly 
ratchet up the reputational consequences of non-cooperation, even in the absence of any formal 
capacity to punish or enforce standards.297 Reporting expectations increase with both the reporting 
behavior of peers and mobilization by civil society. Over time, the oversight committees 
themselves help clarify these expectations.  
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Of course, critics of periodic review are right about a number of its shortcomings. In light 
of the General Assembly’s 2020 review of measures to strengthen the treaty-body system, it is 
imperative to consider what our findings can tell us about reforms that would improve the system’s 
capacity to enhance rights protections. We suggest the following set of policy recommendations 
that would reinforce the operation of the mechanisms identified herein as central to the quality of 
the self-reporting process.  
First, treaty bodies should increase efforts to encourage states to participate, especially to 
submit their first report, since doing so familiarizes governments with the process. The positive 
returns to reporting imply that treaty bodies should also work hard to get states to return to the 
process if they have been absent.298 This could be done via public praise for participation or media 
releases that showcase exemplary reporters. To the extent that greater participation is hampered 
by resource constraints, proposals to hold reviews in OHCHR’s regional offices via 
videoconference with the committees have some merit.299 In-person dialogues may be more 
conducive to socialization than virtual interactions,300 but financial considerations currently 
prevent a broad range of government officials from less resourced states from attending the review 
process. The benefits of frequent and broad participation must be balanced against the less potent 
influence of persuasion through a virtual dialogue. 
Second, as socialization research makes clear, the nature of the dialogue with treaty bodies 
is central to successful internalization of rights norms. Committee members’ language and tone 
matter. Many governments have suggested the dialogue should follow a more “positive”301 and 
“constructive”302 narrative geared toward a “positive impact on the ground through 
implementation,”303 which would facilitate socialization and learning. Despite an increasing turn 
to grades and rankings at the international level,304 we discourage the use of performance “grades” 
by the treaty bodies.305 Persuasion is potentially undermined by a superficial scramble to avoid 
low marks.  
Expertise is also central to the process of persuasion, suggesting that the independence and 
professional qualifications of the treaty body members should be a focus of reform efforts.306 A 
number of state comments for the 2020 review express support for or concern about members’ 
independence and impartiality.307 Several proposals seek to ensure the expertise of members, 
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through an external assessment of candidates’ qualifications and a transparent selection process.308 
Importantly, both the dialogue’s quality and reviewers’ expertise distinguish it from the peer-
review process of the Universal Periodic Review, which should be seen as a complement and not 
a substitute to self-reporting under human rights treaties.309 
Third, the composition of delegations sent to Geneva—and particularly the representatives’ 
connectedness to domestic policy implementation—improves the chances for relevant lessons to 
seep into policy discussions back home. This suggests that the treaty bodies should discourage 
delegations dominated by diplomats and instead encourage high-level ministers as well as lower-
level officials who will be intimately involved in the technical implementation of specific 
recommendations. This includes members of the legislative and judicial branches, and officials 
involved in developing and implementing treaty-specific policies, such as police chiefs for the 
CAT.  
Fourth, successful learning and capacity development depend on interactive dialogue, 
geared toward problem-solving and resulting in a limited set of priority recommendations that are 
targeted and actionable.310 The effectiveness of such frank discussion would be further 
strengthened by using “smaller and more flexible” committee compositions and enabling 
government delegates to seek advice from the committee members on laws or policies during the 
dialogue itself.311 
Fifth, we support “bring[ing] the Treaty Body system closer to the people on the 
ground,”312 by holding some committee meetings away from Geneva and within the region of the 
countries under review. This would enable committee members to “engage in dialogue with people 
on the local level on the ground,”313 and increase the process’s visibility and accessibility for the 
public, local media, and domestic civil society organizations unable to attend sessions in Geneva. 
The OHCHR and treaty body members should proactively disseminate information on the report-
and-review process and the treaty bodies’ concluding observations. Country-specific social media 
campaigns to inform the broader public about the process in a constructive manner could 
complement the committees’ requests to each state to disseminate widely its report and concluding 
observations. Reforms aimed to promote dialogue and coordination with regional human rights 
courts could further reinforce law development as well.314  
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 Finally, since reporting can be so useful, it should be done more efficiently. A number of 
proposals have been made to consolidate or cluster reports, to alleviate the burden of multiple 
reporting requirements for both states and the treaty bodies. The Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights has spearheaded these proposals, suggesting two 
variations.315 Under the first model, a state would be reviewed every seven to eight years by all 
relevant treaty bodies during the same week on the basis of a single report. We advise against 
institutionalizing an eight-year reporting gap, since the review process must cumulatively repeat 
to affect rights practices on the ground.316 Treaty obligations and committee recommendations 
must remain salient for government officials, the media, civil society, and the broader public. 
Without sustained attention, the mechanisms outlined above would be much less effective.317 
Relatedly, a single consolidated review would unnecessarily limit the attention certain issues 
receive within national public discourse and hinder meaningful engagement with highly mobilized 
CSOs around certain issue-specific treaties (i.e., CERD, CEDAW, CRC). Too much consolidation 
in a single report-and-review process could make it harder for organizations to access the process 
and garner the committees’ attention.318 
Under the second proposed model, states would be reviewed by all relevant committees 
over an eight-year cycle, but clustered around two reviews by different committees at four-year 
intervals. In principle, we are not opposed to temporal clustering of reviews, with one focusing on 
ICCPR and ICESCR obligations and the second on issue-specific treaties. However, as with the 
first proposed model, we would discourage extending the periodicity of each review cluster to 
eight years. 
Conversations involving periodic reporting are impactful when they go beyond 
bureaucratized routines bent on satisfying a panel in Geneva and instead contribute to 
domesticizing international human rights in law and practice. Much of the action must necessarily 
take place outside of Geneva, in law- and policy-making settings. Criminalizing gender-based 
violence, prohibiting gender discrimination in public educational systems, guaranteeing freedom 
of association, and reforming prisons all depend first on implementing legislation.319  
Reviewing such legislation is beyond the scope of this Article. We recognize that 
implementation has in many cases been slow, but there is some evidence that governments have 
responded to higher-quality report-and-review interactions over time. Legislatures have begun—
gradually and selectively—to pass laws that address shortcomings identified by the treaty bodies.  
In African countries, the reporting process has helped develop the capacity necessary to 
make important legislative changes in a range of economic, social, and cultural rights of vulnerable 
persons, including legislation to improve access to education and nutrition in Namibia and 
progressive anti-human trafficking legislation in Algeria. Ghana, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have 
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also introduced significant programs resulting from conversations with the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.320 CEDAW has been brought into legislative debates in Latin 
America relating to wage equality, decriminalizing abortion, and the minimum age for marriage.321 
In Mexico, for example, reforms of a 2007 Law of Access of Women to a Life Free From Violence 
(Ley General de Accesso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia)322 relied on CEDAW 
committee recommendations.323 Legislators in Argentina referred to CAT committee observations 
to call for prison reform.324 Of course, conversations with expert committees cannot force 
implementation. But in many cases, bringing these perspectives into domestic debates emphasizes 
the gravity and urgency of an issue and gives domestic actors additional persuasive leverage. 
Increasingly, there is evidence that this is occurring.325 
Self-reporting systems are increasingly pervasive in international law and institutions. As 
the history and development of the human rights treaty system shows, in many cases they are 
considered “bare minimum” enforcement tools in areas where states are especially sensitive to 
external intrusions into their sovereignty. However, we have demonstrated that treaty ratification 
sets in motion an institutional process that engages states constructively. None of this occurs in a 
political, social, or institutional vacuum. Persuasion, social pressure, and learning take place during 
the report-and-review process.  
Over time, governments develop some capacity and expertise to collect and analyze 
information, detect violations, and deal with them in their domestic settings. Civil society 
organizations offer additional and sometimes contradictory information, mobilize around the 
reporting process, and articulate demands for change. Regional courts have increasingly looked to 
the expert committees’ concluding observations to support their judgments. The reporting system 
therefore has the potential to reverberate in domestic and regional politics, policy, and law and 
thereby improve the realization of human rights on the ground.  
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